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The Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger changed the meaning of "narrow tailoring. " While the
narrow tailoring requirement has always had multiple dimensions, a central
meaning has been that the government must use the smallest racial preference
needed to achieve its compelling interest. We might have expected, therefore,
that if the Court were to uphold one of the two programs at issue in Grutter and
Gratz, it would, all other things being equal, uphold the program with smaller
racial preferences. We show, however, that the preferences in the admissions
program upheld in Grutter were larger than the preferences in the admissions
program struck down in Gratz.
This result was not necessarily wrong, but the Court's analysis was wrong.
The Grutter and Gratz Courts replaced the "minimum necessary preference"
requirement with a requirement that admissions programs provide
"individualized consideration," which we show amounts to a "Don't Tell, Don't
Ask" regime. The Court will not "ask" probing questions about the size and
differentiation of preferences as long as the government decisionmaker does not
"tell" the Court how much of a racial preference it is giving. Indeed, as an
example of the differential standards the Court applied, we demonstrate that
while the Court impugned the admissions program at issue in Gratz for making
race decisive for "virtually every minimally qualified minority applicant, " in
fact the fraction of qualified minority applicants for whom race was decisive was
smaller in the admissions program struck down in Gratz than it was in the
admissions program upheld in Grutter.
We call for a return to the minimum necessary preference requirement.
Instead of examining whether preferences are "individualized," courts should
determine whether the constitutionally relevant benefits of granting preferences
of a given size outweigh the constitutionally relevant costs, both overall and at
the margin.
[Vol. 85:517
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 518 2006-2007
Don't Tell, Don't Ask
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v.
Bollinger2 represent a sea-change in the requirement that affirmative action
plans be "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling government interest.
While the narrow tailoring requirement has always had multiple dimensions,
3
a central meaning has been that the government must use the smallest racial
preference needed to achieve its compelling interest. 4 Sometimes expressed
as a requirement that plans use the "least restrictive" or "least burdensome"
alternative, a core idea has been that plans should use the minimum
necessary racial preference.5 If the government objectives could be fulfilled
without use of a racial preference, then no racial preference would be
allowed.6 If only mild racial preferences were needed to achieve the
compelling government interest, then nothing more than mild preferences
would be constitutionally countenanced.
Grutter and Gratz changed all of this. At least in the university
admissions context, these opinions jettisoned this "minimum necessary
preference" requirement and in its place imposed a requirement that
affirmative action programs be "individualized.",7 This Article unpacks the
possible meanings of individualization. We show that the Court's individu-
alization inquiry requires consideration of the extent to which racial
preferences are (1) quantified, (2) undifferentiated, and (3) excessive.8
Under Grutter and Gratz, quantification of preferences essentially
triggers stricter scrutiny of differentiation and excessiveness. The Grutter
and Gratz decisions establish a kind of "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" regime. If
the government decisionmaker does not "tell" courts how much of a racial
preference it is giving (by not quantifying its preferences), courts will essen-
tially not "ask" probing questions about whether the preferences are
differentiated or excessive. In sharp contrast, courts will subject plans that
do "tell" to stricter scrutiny-which is likely to be fatal in fact.9
Seen through this lens, the new narrow tailoring requirement is both too
harsh with respect to quantified plans and too lenient with respect to
unquantified plans. It is too hard on quantified plans because there is nothing
in the act of "telling" or quantifying the degree of racial preference that
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
6. This is another way of stating the requirement that race-neutral alternatives be used when
possible. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra subpart IV(A).
8. See infra subpart IV(B).
9. See infra subpart IV(C).
20071
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should in and of itself render a plan unconstitutional.'° Indeed, quantification
of some sort is a necessary prerequisite of being able to test whether racial
preferences are narrowly tailored to achieve the government's compelling
interest." The Court's wrong-headed preference for unquantified plans thus
makes it more difficult to perform any kind of cost-benefit calculus. The
Court is too lenient with respect to unquantified plans because it does not
subject them to a meaningful constitutional calculus.
The Court should return to the minimum necessary preference
standard.12  Because quantification is necessary to determine whether a
preference is the minimum necessary, the Court should require universities to
quantify the costs and benefits of their affirmative action programs. This
quantification could be-but does not have to be-independent of the use of
a point system like that used in Gratz.'3 Under this view, quantified prefer-
ences would be neither per se constitutional nor per se unconstitutional;
rather, their constitutionality would turn on whether the means were in fact
tailored to their ends.' 4
We support the Court's theoretical embrace of differentiated
preferences. Undifferentiated, one-size-fits-all preferences on their face fail
to tailor the benefits to the costs. More nuanced preferences that give mi-
norities varying degrees of preference can be better tailored to minimize the
size of racial preferences necessary to achieve the government's interest. 15
But, once again, the insistence on unquantified preference schemes under-
mines the ability of courts to test whether a particular plan is in fact nuanced.
Despite the majestic words of the Grutter opinion, the Supreme Court did not
require that the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) in fact
grant varying preferences to different minority applicants 6it merely re-
quired that the Law School's preferences were potentially differentiated.' 7 It
is possible that the Law School's admissions in fact gave an equal racial
boost to all minority applicants-or to all members of the same race. But the
Court showed no interest in ascertaining whether or how the racial prefer-
ences varied in fact.' 8  It is simply not possible to test whether an
unquantified algorithm grants differentiated or undifferentiated preferences.
10. See infra section V(A)(1).
11. See infra section V(B)(2).
12. See infra section V(B)(1).
13. 539 U.S. 244, 255-57 (2003).
14. See infra section V(B)(2).
15. See infra section V(B)(1).
16. The University of Michigan Law School and College of Literature, Science, and the Arts
granted racial preferences to some, but not all, minority groups. See infra note 49. It is, therefore,
not accurate to say that either school gave all minorities preferences. Because using the more
accurate term "preferred minorities" is cumbersome, however, we frequently-but not always-use
the term "minorities" throughout this Article when what we really mean is "preferred minorities."
17. See infra section IV(B)(2).
18. See infra section IV(B)(2).
[Vol. 85:517
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The Court's dicta favoring differentiated racial preferences, however,
suggest a useful move toward "marginalism." Affirmative action defendants
should show not only that their plans' total benefits exceed their total costs,
but also that the benefits from the last unit of affirmative action are greater
than the costs of this last unit. That is, defendants should show that the plan
uses the minimum necessary preference not just on average but on the
margin. 19
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part II describes
the requirements of narrow tailoring before Grutter and Gratz and argues that
the minimum necessary preference requirement was central to narrow tailor-
ing analysis. Part III shows that the rulings in Grutter and Gratz are likely
perverse from the minimum necessary preference perspective because the
admissions program that the Court upheld in Grutter in all likelihood granted
minorities greater racial preferences than the program the Court struck down
in Gratz. Part IV describes the changes wrought by Grutter and Gratz, ex-
plaining that the Court essentially replaced the minimum necessary
preference requirement with a "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" individualization
requirement. Finally, Part V lays out our normative critique of Grutter and
Gratz and sketches a more fully articulated vision of what narrow tailoring
should require. We call not just for a return to the minimum necessary pref-
erence requirement but for a jurisprudence that more explicitly quantifies the
overall and marginal costs and benefits of affirmative action.
II. Narrow Tailoring Before Grutter and Gratz
While narrow tailoring has always had several meanings, a central
meaning has been that the size of racial preferences used in affirmative
action programs should be the minimum necessary to achieve the compelling
government interest. This Part will begin by describing the multiple mean-
ings of the narrow tailoring requirement. It will then argue that both the
narrow tailoring doctrine and the principles that underlie the narrow tailoring
requirement recognize a minimum necessary preference requirement. This
Part will then close by observing that given this requirement, we would have
expected the Grutter and Gratz Courts to have engaged in a minimum neces-
sary preference inquiry.
The pre-Grutter and Gratz case law developed several requirements that
affirmative action programs must fulfill to satisfy the narrow tailoring prong
of strict scrutiny. 20 First, the beneficiary class of the program must not be
19. See infra section V(B)(I).
20. Compare this list to the one Robert Post created to summarize what the Grutter Court stated
should be considered as part of the narrow tailoring inquiry. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court,
2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 66-67 (2003) ("The [Grutter] Court... holds [that the 'narrowly tailored' prong of the
strict scrutiny test] has four components. A race-based affirmative action program (1) must 'not
unduly harm members of any racial group'; (2) can be implemented only if there has been a
2007]
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overinclusive in relation to the compelling government interest that justifies
the program.2' Second, the affirmative action program must be flexible and
treat people as individuals when necessary to achieve the compelling gov-
22ernment interest. In the context of higher education at least, this means that
rigid quotas cannot be used.23 Third, the affirmative action program must be
temporary.24 Fourth, the possibility of achieving the ends of the affirmative
action program by race-neutral means must be considered and rejected as not
possible.2 5
Iserious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity the university seeks'; (3) 'must be limited in time'; and (4) must afford each applicant
'truly individualized consideration."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 341, 339, 342, 334 (2003))). Also compare this list to the one Richard Fallon created that
describes the elements of the narrow tailoring inquiry in all contexts, not just the equal protection
context. Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming June 2007)
(manuscript at 126-37, on file with authors) (listing four inquiries: (1) "[n]ecessity of infringement
on a triggering right," (2) "underinclusiveness," (3) "overinclusiveness," and (4) "proportionality").
21. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (holding a set-
aside benefiting individuals from several racial groups from all over the country not narrowly
tailored to remedying past discrimination against African Americans in Richmond because, inter
alia, the beneficiary group was overinclusive); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284
n. 13 (1986) (plurality opinion) (criticizing a school board's layoff provision that targeted certain
groups of minorities as "undifferentiated" and noting that the board did not justify its selection of
the minority groups that the plan favored). One of us has pointed out that "[als a theoretical matter,
one might also conclude that an underinclusive program is not narrowly tailored [to the remedial
interest] if victims of discrimination are arbitrarily excluded from the affirmative action
preferences." Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1786 n.13 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (distinguishing the quota at issue in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), from the one at issue in Croson by noting its flexible waiver and
exemption elements and concluding that "programs [such as the one in Fullilove] are less
problematic from an equal protection standpoint because they treat all candidates individually,
rather than making the color of an applicant's skin the sole relevant consideration"); United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177 (1987) (plurality opinion) (noting approvingly that waivers built into
the affirmative action plan at issue give it flexibility); cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("[T]ruly
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.").
23. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978) (Powell, J.); cf
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use
a quota system .... ").
24. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (noting that
affirmative action programs should not last longer than necessary); Croson, 488 U.S. at 510
("[D]eviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary
matter .. "); cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 ("[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited
in time."). Note that conceptually, narrow tailoring does not entail a limited duration requirement
when the compelling government interest is diversity rather than remedying past discrimination.
The Sixth Circuit so recognized when it reversed the district court on this point in Grutter.
Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 751-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (noting that strict scrutiny requires consideration of
race-neutral means); Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (noting disapprovingly that "there does not appear to
have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means"); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280
n.6 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he term [narrowly tailored] .... may be used to require consideration of
whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used."); cf Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 339 ("Narrow tailoring does ... require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
[Vol. 85:517
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In addition, though, a central meaning of narrow tailoring before
Grutter and Gratz was that preferences granted to minorities in affirmative
action programs should be the minimum necessary to achieve the compelling
government interest.26 This meaning is perhaps the most obvious application
of the tailoring metaphor itself-it is essentially a requirement that prefer-
ences granted to minorities not be too "baggy" or too "tight., 27 In addition,
this minimum necessary preference requirement follows directly from the
threads of the Court's strict scrutiny jurisprudence that require that affirma-
tive action programs be the "least restrictive alternative" 28 and "work the
least harm possible" 29 on nonpreferred racial groups so as not to impose an
undue burden on them.30  Finally, this minimum necessary preference
requirement is consistent with the requirement that race-neutral alternatives
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks."). But see Ayres, supra note
21 (noting the tension between requiring that narrowly tailored means be used and encouraging the
solution of race-specific problems with race-neutral means).
26. Note that the race-neutral alternatives requirement is an application of this minimum
necessary preference principle to the case where racial preferences are not necessary to achieve the
objectives of the government. When race-neutral means exist for accomplishing the objectives of
the government, then racial preferences are not the minimum necessary and are therefore not
allowed.
27. At least as a theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be
too large, but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant
compelling government interest. See Ayres, supra note 21, at 1786 n. 13.
28. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Unquestionably we have held that a government
practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is
to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available."); see also Wygant, 476
U.S. at 280 n.6 (plurality opinion) (noting that the narrow tailoring inquiry requires "consideration
of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used"). Some older cases
include language suggesting that strict scrutiny does not demand use of the least restrictive means.
See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("Nor have we in
all situations 'required remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of
implementation."' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring))); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court has not required
remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of implementation."). In light of more
recent cases demanding consideration of race-neutral alternatives and applying a stricter version of
strict scrutiny, however, these cases are no longer good law with respect to this point. See supra
note 25.
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (Powell, J.) ("[T]he remedial action usually remains subject to
continuing oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons
competing for the benefit.").
30. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that to pass constitutional muster, programs should not "unduly burden individuals who are
not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups"); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion)
(stating that the impact on third parties should be considered); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (Powell, J.)
(noting that continued oversight typically ensures "the least harm possible" to others); cf Grutter,
539 U.S. at 341 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not unduly
burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432-67
(1997) (arguing that equal protection analysis should move from an examination of costs and
benefits to an examination of impermissible purposes).
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be considered-indeed, it is a generalized version of the race-neutral
alternatives requirement. Whereas the race-neutral alternatives requirement
demands the use of zero preferences when possible, the minimum necessary
preference requirement demands use of minimum preferences. 31
Some Justices have explicitly recognized that the minimum necessary
preference inquiry should be part of the narrow tailoring inquiry. For
example, in her dissent to United States v. Paradise, Justice O'Connor noted
that for the quota at issue to be narrowly tailored, the number of spaces set
aside by the quota should be no more than was necessary to achieve the gov-
ernment interest:
The one-for-one promotion quota used in this case far exceeded the
percentage of blacks in the trooper force, and there is no evidence in
the record that such an extreme quota was necessary to eradicate the
effects of the Department's delay. The plurality attempts to defend
this one-for-one promotion quota as merely affecting the speed by
which the Department attains the goal of 25% black representation in
the upper ranks. Such a justification, however, necessarily eviscerates
any notion of "narrowly tailored" because it has no stopping point;
even a 100% quota could be defended on the ground that it merely
"determined how quickly the Department progressed toward" some
ultimate goal. If strict scrutiny is to have any meaning, therefore, a
promotion goal must have a closer relationship to the percentage of
blacks eligible for promotions.32
Justice O'Connor continued, connecting this minimum necessary
preference notion to the idea that preferences should work the "least harm
possible" to members of nonpreferred racial groups:
31. For a description of the race-neutral alternatives requirement, see supra note 25.
32. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 198-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Other Justices
have recognized that a size inquiry is important but have not framed the inquiry in terms of whether
a given size is the smallest necessary. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., the Court criticized
the thirty-percent set-aside at issue because the thirty-percent figure rested on "the 'completely
unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population." 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-82 (plurality opinion) (upholding a fifty-percent promotion rate for
African Americans, noting that the fifty-percent figure was not arbitrary relative to the twenty-five
percent labor pool and the twenty-five percent representation of African Americans in the upper
ranks); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the ten-percent figure was
"reasonable" because it fell approximately halfway between the percentage of the population who
were minorities (seventeen percent) and the percentage of contractors who were minorities (four
percent)). Note, however, that these discussions of weight in Paradise and Fullilove are from a
plurality decision and a concurrence, respectively. Moreover, the scrutiny applied in these opinions
was not full strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action
Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REv. 524, 547-48 (1987) (noting how Justice
Powell adhered weakly to the strict scrutiny test in his Fullilove concurrence). So, to the extent that
these opinions countenance upholding racial preferences without consideration of whether
preferences are the minimum necessary, their analysis on this point may not still be controlling.
[Vol. 85:517
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This is not to say that the percentage of minority individuals benefited
by a racial goal may never exceed the percentage of minority group
members in the relevant work force. But protection of the rights of
nonminority workers demands that a racial goal not substantially
exceed the percentage of minority group members in the relevant
population or work force absent compelling justification.33
The minimum necessary preference requirement of narrow tailoring also
resonates with Justice Powell's Bakke opinion. Justice Powell explained that
in a narrowly tailored admissions program,
[t]he file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being
decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.
34
In this passage, Justice Powell suggested that an admissions program
would place too much weight on race if it admitted racial minorities over
nonminorities who could have better contributed to the diversity of the
student body because of their nonracial attributes.35  Justice Powell
essentially observed that the weight placed on race should be no larger than
that which is necessary to achieve the compelling government interest.
The minimum necessary preference meaning of narrow tailoring finds
support not only in the doctrine, as described above, but also in the principles
motivating the strict scrutiny requirement. There are two generally accepted
accounts of the function of strict scrutiny analysis in equal protection
33. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Other Justices have examined the
weight given to race and its effect on nonbeneficiaries but have not articulated a standard for
determining whether the weight is too much. For example, Justice Powell's concurrence in
Fullilove noted the importance of examining "the effect of the set-aside upon innocent third
parties." 448 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell observed that the set-aside at
issue would "reserve about 0.25% of all the funds expended yearly on construction work in the
United States for approximately 4% of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority
group" and concluded that it was constitutionally permissible because "the effect of the set-aside
[was] limited and so widely dispersed." Id. at 514-15; see also id. at 484 (plurality opinion)
("When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior
discrimination, such 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible."). To the
extent that these opinions countenance upholding racial preferences without consideration of
whether racial preferences are the minimum necessary, it should be remembered that Fullilove was
decided in an era when strict scrutiny was far less strict than it is today, and therefore its analysis on
this point may not still be good law. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race,
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 870 (2004) (describing the Fullilove
standard as less "exacting" than the Croson standard); Schwartz, supra note 32, at 547-48 ("Justice
Powell's Fullilove opinion was an especially revealing indicator of how weakly he adhered to the
strict scrutiny test.").
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.).
35. Note that to the extent that the diversity interest in Grutter and Gratz is different from the
one articulated in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, see infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text,
the analysis on this point must be adjusted to take account of the differences, see infra note 221.
2007]
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jurisprudence.36  First, strict scrutiny is a way to "smoke out" illegitimate
motives of those who create programs using a racial classification. 37 Second,
strict scrutiny is a tool for ensuring that the benefits of programs using racial
classifications outweigh the costs. 38  A minimum necessary preference re-
quirement furthers both of these purposes. After all, if the size of a
preference for a particular program is larger than that which is needed to
achieve the compelling government interest, then it raises questions about
whether there are illegitimate motives for the program. In addition, the best
way for an affirmative action program to minimize costs while maximizing
benefits is to grant the smallest preference necessary to achieve the compel-
ling government interest.
This Part has argued that prior to Grutter and Gratz, narrow tailoring
doctrine recognized-as it should have-a minimum necessary preference
requirement. Given this requirement, we might have expected the Grutter
and Gratz Courts to consider whether the racial preferences at the Law
School and the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and
the Arts (College) were the minimum necessary. Doing so would have re-
quired the Court to engage in an inquiry into how much weight each school
placed on race and whether the amount of weight was necessary to achieve
the benefits of the diversity interest. Such an inquiry would have necessi-
tated not only an overall cost-benefit analysis, but also a marginal cost-
benefit analysis.39
The Grutter and Gratz Courts did not engage in such an inquiry.
Unfortunately, even at this late date, the Court is far from being able to
conduct such an inquiry. Not only has the Court not established a
methodology for comparing both overall and marginal costs and benefits, but
the Court has not even established a methodology for measuring the
constitutionally relevant costs and benefits of racial preferences.
40
36. Richard Fallon argues that embedded in the doctrine is a third account of the function of
strict scrutiny: "[s]trict [s]crutiny as a [n]early [c]ategorical [p]rohibition." Fallon, supra note 20
(manuscript at 80-85).
37. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); see also Fallon, supra note 20 (manuscript at
89-97) (discussing "[s]trict [s]crutiny as an [i]llicit [mlotive [t]est"); Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at
428 ("One powerful function of strict scrutiny has always been that of 'smoking out' invidious
purposes masquerading behind putatively legitimate public policy.").
38. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995) (noting that
"whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has
suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection" and stating that "[t]he application of strict scrutiny ... determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that injury"); Rubenfeld, supra note 30,
at 428 (stating that strict scrutiny has "become a cost-benefit test measuring whether a law that falls
(according to the Court itself) squarely within the prohibition of the equal protection guarantee is
justified by the specially important social gains that it will achieve"); see also Fallon, supra note 20
(manuscript at 85-89) (discussing "[s]trict [s]crutiny as a [w]eighted [b]alancing [tiest").
39. See infra section V(B)(1).
40. Indeed, as Part IV will argue, not only did the Grutter and Gratz Courts not develop
methodologies for conducting the cost-benefit calculus, but also they effectively replaced the cost-
[Vol. 85:517
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Part III of this Article outlines one way that courts can measure the
costs of racial preferences and demonstrates the surprising result that the Law
School's admissions program, which the Court upheld, actually gave more
weight to race than did the College's admissions program, which the Court
struck down. That is, the costs of the Law School's admissions program
were higher than the costs of the College's admissions program. This result
is surprising because if all other things are equal, a court applying a mini-
mum necessary preference approach would not strike down an admissions
program giving race less weight than an admissions program that it upholds.
The fact that the Court did just this in the two Michigan cases therefore pre-
sents a bit of a puzzle.
Of course, all other things were probably not equal at the College and
the Law School-the benefits flowing from diversity at a given cost may
have been different at the two schools. So, that the Law School probably
gave more weight to race than the College does not necessarily indicate that
the outcomes of the decisions are wrong. But the result in Part Ill-that the
Law School placed more weight on race than the College-should raise an
eyebrow and prompt further inquiry into whether this greater amount of
weight placed on race was justified by the benefits.
III. Grutter and Gratz: How Much Weight the Law School and College
Placed on Race
There are two key dimensions that courts should pay attention to when
measuring the costs of preferential admissions programs, and arguably the
Law School had greater racial preferences on both dimensions. 41 The first
benefit calculus with an "individualization" requirement. And, while the Grutter and Gratz Courts
developed some methodologies for measuring the costs of affirmative action, those methodologies
do not capture costs that are constitutionally relevant. See infra section V(A)(2).
41. We are not the first to suggest that the Law School may have placed more weight on race
than the College, but we are the first to defend the proposition with rigorous empirical analysis.
Richard Sander is the only scholar who has attempted to prove empirically that the Law School
placed more weight on race than the College, see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text, but he
ignores the outcome dimension, and there are several problems with his analysis of the means
dimension, see infra note 87. Other scholars have suggested that the Law School may have placed
more weight on race but have provided no empirical support for this assertion. Abigail Thernstrom
and Stephan Thernstrom state that the Law School's preferences were greater than the College's,
but the source they cite for support of this proposition, Judge Boggs's dissenting opinion in the
Sixth Circuit in Grutter, made no claims about whether the College or the Law School provided
greater preferences. See Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Secrecy and Dishonesty: The
Supreme Court, Racial Preferences, and Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 259-60 &
n.38 (2004) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 796 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). Thernstrom and Themstrom's statement is therefore without empirical
support. Similarly, Colin Diver states that "[b]ased on the statistics unearthed by the plaintiffs, and
summarized in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist [in Grutter], it appears that the
advantage conferred on minority applicants by the law school was, in relative terms, as weighty as
that conferred by the undergraduate point system." Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The
Dt ur- ,ro, Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. Rv. 691 718 (footnote omitted). Diver offers no
direct support for this proposition, however, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's Grutter dissent never
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dimension, which we call the outcome dimension, examines the outcomes of
the affirmative action program-the extent to which the affirmative action
program displaces nonpreferred applicants. The second dimension, which
we call the means dimension, examines the explicit or implicit means used to
achieve the outcomes-the boost that preferred minorities receive on account
of their race.42 These two dimensions do not need to move in any particular
lock-step fashion-after all, it is possible to have an admissions program that
gives a large boost to minority applicants but admits only a small number of
minority applicants on account of that boost and therefore weights race
heavily on the means dimension, but not on the outcome dimension, and vice
versa. 43  The two subparts that follow describe how to measure each
addressed the relative weight given to race at the Law School and the College. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378-87 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Diver's statement is therefore
also without empirical support.
As far as we know, the University of Michigan's expert statistician did not directly compare the
weight given to race at the Law School and the College. His analysis can, however, be used to
compare the weight at the two schools along the outcome dimension. See infra notes 61-72 and
accompanying text.
The plaintiffs' expert statistician, Kinley Larntz, attempted to compare the weight given to race
at the Law School and the College by comparing the overall "odds ratios" at the two schools. See
Third Supplemental Expert Report of Kinley Larntz at 2-3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d
821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928-DT). Larntz calculated odds ratios for each school for
each year from 1995-1999, controlling for GPA and test score. Id. at 2. For the College, Larntz
also controlled for residency status. Id. For the Law School, Larntz compared white applicants
with each of four subgroups of minority applicants: Native Americans, African Americans, Mexican
Americans, and Puerto Ricans. Id. For the College, Lamtz compared non-underrepresented
minorities with underrepresented minorities. Id. Larntz found that for all five years, the odds ratios
at the College were substantially higher than the odds ratios at the Law School for Native
Americans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans, suggesting that the College placed more weight
on race than the Law School with respect to these subgroups. Id. at 7-11. When Larntz compared
the odds ratios at the College with the odds ratios at the Law School for African Americans,
however, the results were different: for two years, including 1999, the odds ratios were substantially
larger at the Law School, id. at 8, 11 (1996 and 1999); for one year, the odds ratio was substantially
larger at the College, id. at 7 (1995); and for two years, the odds ratios were comparable, id. at 9-10
(1997 and 1998). Larntz's odds ratios did not compare the same groups at both schools, nor did he
control for the same factors at each school. Moreover, Larntz's odds ratio measure does not
satisfactorily measure weight assigned to race on either the outcome or the means dimension: it
does not capture the number of students displaced on account of affirmative action, nor does it give
a sense for the amount of boost but-for admits actually received. We therefore do not discuss
Larntz's measure further. We note, however, that Larntz's results are not inconsistent with our
ultimate finding that the program at issue in Gratz-the College's program implemented in 1999,
see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text-placed less weight on race than the program at issue
in Grutter.
42. See Ayres, supra note 21, at 1803-04 (describing two dimensions to racial preferences in
the contracting context); see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
31-39 (1998) (observing that the degree of racial preferences can be measured by examining both
the number of but-for admits and also the qualification differentials between but-for admits and
nonpreferred applicants who would have been admitted in the absence of affirmative action).
43. There are several ways to aggregate these two dimensions, but one is to multiply the two
dimensions together. If race is decisive for x% of all admitted applicants, and the effective credit
for race is y units, we can say that the overall weight placed on race is xy units. Using this logic, we
might find, for example, that an affirmative action program that gives minority applicants an
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dimension and discuss how the Law School and College admissions
programs fare under each measure.
A. Outcome Dimension
To measure the outcome dimension, we must look at the number of
admitted applicants who, but for their race, would not have been admitted.
We call these admitted applicants "but-for admits." For the number of but-
for admits itself to be meaningful, we need to compare it to the total number
of admits-that is, we must look at the percentage of all admits who are but-
for admits. 44  Note that comparing the number of but-for admits to the
effective credit of 15 LSAT points and is decisive for 10% of the admitted applicants places the
same amount of weight on race as a program that gives minority applicants an effective credit of 10
LSAT points and is decisive for 15% of the admitted applicants. See Ayres, supra note 21, at 1804.
44. It may be the case that the percentage of admits who accept offers of admission-a statistic
known as the "yield"-is different for applicants who are given a racial preference and applicants
who receive no racial preference. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42, at 33-34 (describing evidence
that the yield for African American students is much lower than for white students, at least at highly
selective colleges); Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2002) (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42).
If the yield is in fact different for preferred applicants and nonpreferred applicants, then the outcome
dimension should probably be measured not by the percentage of admits who are but-for admits, but
rather by the percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits. But, this becomes a more difficult
normative calculus, in part because there might be a constitutional cost to racial preferences even if
none of the but-for admits accept their offers of admission.
Yield data were not available to us, and we therefore did not calculate the percentage of
enrollees who were but-for admits. We note, however, that data were available to us from which we
could compute yields for the College in 1995 and the Law School in 2000. One of the reports of the
defendants' expert statistician included yield data for several subgroups of applicants to the College
in 1995. See Supplemental Expert Report of Stephen W. Raudenbush at 11 tbl.3, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT) [hereinafter Raudenbush,
Supplemental Expert Report (July 13, 2000)], available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/
admissions/research/swrjul 13.pdf. Using these data, we calculated that for the College in 1995, the
yield for minorities was 41.3% and the yield for nonminorities was 33.9%. See infra note 68. The
Grutter district court opinion included data that permitted us to compute yields for the Law School
in 2000. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 839 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The opinion stated that in 2000, there were
170 minority admits and 58 minority enrollees. Id. The minority yield was therefore 34.1%. As
described in note 65, we calculated that the number of nonminority admits in 2000 was 1,240.
Because the 58 minority enrollees constituted 14.5% of the entering class, see id., it follows that the
number of nonminority enrollees was 342. Thus, the yield for nonminorities was 27.6%. So, the
yield was approximately 7 percentage points larger for minorities than it was for nonminorities at
both the College in 1995 and the Law School in 2000.
To the extent that the yield differs for applicants receiving a racial preference and those not
receiving a racial preference, it is likely that the differences in the yields are sufficiently similar at
the Law School and the College that if the percentage of admits who were but-for admits is larger at
the Law School than at the College, the percentage of enrollees who were but-for admits is also
larger at the Law School than at the College. This principle certainly holds true when applied to the
data from the Law School in 2000 and the College in 1995. Compare infra text accompanying note
66 (establishing that using Raudenbush's calculations, 8.8% of 2000 Law School admits were but-
for admits), and infra text accompanying note 68 (establishing that using Raudenbush's
calculations, 7.8% of 1995 College admits were but-for admits), with infra note 66 (establishing that
using Raudenbush's calculations, 10.50/o of 2000 Law School enrollees were but-for admits), and
infra note 67 (establishing that using Raudenbush's calculations, 9.3% of 1995 College enrollees
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number of qualified minority applicants does not help measure the outcome
dimension because it does not measure the burden on nonpreferred
applicants.45
Available to the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz were admissions
data from the Law School and the College46 broken down by GPA range,47
test score range,48 race,49 Michigan residency status, and year.5° So, for
were but-for admits). We therefore assumed that comparing the percentages of admits who were
but-for admits at the Law School and the College was a good proxy for comparing the percentages
of enrollees who were but-for admits at the two schools.
45. In Gratz, the Court found it relevant that the affirmative action program had "the effect of
making 'the factor of race . . . decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented
minority applicant." 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003) (omission in original) (quoting Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J.)); see also infra note 142 and accompanying
text. For a critique of this measure of weight, see infra subsection V(A)(2)(c).
46. Data were available in many different forms, but we took our data from the expert reports of
Kinley Larntz, the plaintiffs' expert. Supplemental Expert Report of Kinley Larntz, Gratz, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 811 (No. 97-CV-75231-DT) [hereinafter Lamtz, Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz];
Revised Second Supplemental Expert Report of Kinley Larntz, Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (No. 97-
CV-75231-DT) [hereinafter Larntz, Revised Second Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz];
Supplemental Expert Report of Kinley Larntz, Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (No. 97-CV-75928-
DT) [hereinafter Larntz, Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter]; Second Supplemental Expert
Report of Kinley Lamtz, Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (No. 97-CV-75928-DT) [hereinafter Lamtz,
Second Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter]; Fourth Supplemental Expert Report of Kinley
Larntz, Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (No. 97-CV-75928-DT) [hereinafter Lamtz, Fourth
Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter]. Lamtz took the data from the University of Michigan and
created tables that broke down the data as described above. See, e.g., Larntz, Supplemental Expert
Report, Gratz, supra, at 1-2.
47. College data for 1995-1997 included both a "GPA 1" and "GPA 2," and College data for
1998 and 1999 included only one GPA. Larntz, Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46,
at 1-2; Larntz, Revised Second Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46, at 1-2. The
GPA 1 is the actual GPA of applicants, while the GPA 2 is a number calculated by starting with the
actual GPA and then adding or subtracting points for other factors such as quality of high school
and strength of the curriculum. See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 827 n. 15; Brief for the Petitioners at
5-6, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 164186. In 1997, the GPA 2 also included points
for minority status. See Joint Appendix at 111-12, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516); see also
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. Our calculations used the actual GPA of the applicants: GPA 1 for 1995-
1997 and the only GPA provided for 1998-1999.
48. The test for which College test score ranges were available was the SAT. See Larntz,
Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46, at 1; Larntz, Revised Second Supplemental
Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46, at 1-2. The test for which Law School test score ranges were
available was the LSAT. See Larntz, Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1;
Larntz, Second Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1; Lamtz, Fourth
Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1.
49. For the Law School, data were available on admissions statistics for particular races such as
African Americans and Native Americans, but such data were not further broken down by residency
status. Data were available, however, for "Selected Minorities" and "Majority Applicants" that
were further broken down by residency status (and the other factors described above), and these
were the data we used. See Larntz, Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46; Lamtz,
Second Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46; Lamtz, Fourth Supplemental Expert
Report, Grutter, supra note 46. Inspection of the data revealed that four subgroups made up the
larger group of "Selected Minorities": African Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and
Native Americans. Cf Larntz, Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1 (stating
that the report analyzes the relationship between Law School acceptance and membership in the
group of "selected minorities (Native American, African American, Mexican American, or Puerto
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example, the data could answer questions such as how many nonresident
minorities applied to and were accepted by the Law School in 1997 with
GPAs between 3.50 and 3.74 and LSAT scores between 159 and 160.
To calculate the number of but-for admits, 5' we first computed what we
called the "probability enhancement"-the probability of admission for
preferred minority applicants minus the probability of admission for
nonpreferred applicants-for each combination of GPA range, test score
Rican)"); Larntz, Second Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1 (same); Larntz,
Fourth Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46, at 1 (same). Inspection of the data also
revealed that five subgroups made up the larger group of "Majority Applicants": Caucasians, "Other
Hispanic Americans," Asian Americans, Foreign Applicants, and "Unknown Ethnicity" applicants.
So, when we refer to "preferred minority" Law School applicants, we mean African Americans,
Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans.
For the College, data were not available for particular minority subgroups but were available
only for "Underrepresented Minorities" and "Not Underrepresented Minorities." Larntz,
Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46, at 1-2; Larntz, Revised Second Supplemental
Expert Report, Gratz, supra note 46, at 1-2. While the data in the reports do not indicate which
subgroups were included in the larger group of "Underrepresented Minorities," the College's brief
stated that the College "consider[ed] African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be
underrepresented minorities for purposes of considering race or ethnicity in admissions." Brief for
Respondents at 9 n.13, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 402237 [hereinafter Brief for
Respondents, Gratz]. So, when we refer to "preferred minority" College applicants, we mean
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.
50. Data for the Law School were available for the years 1995 through 2000. Lantz,
Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46; Larntz, Second Supplemental Expert Report,
Grutter, supra note 46; Larntz, Fourth Supplemental Expert Report, Grutter, supra note 46. Data
for the College were available for the years 1995 through 1999. Larntz, Supplemental Expert
Report, Gratz, supra note 46; Lamtz, Revised Second Supplemental Expert Report, Gratz, supra
note 46. Throughout this Article, when we refer to data for year x, we are referring to data for the
class entering in the fall of year x.
51. Our method for computing the number of but-for admits is identical to one of the methods
used by Linda Wightman in her 1997 study of admissions to the 173 ABA-approved law schools in
the 1990-1991 application year. In Wightman's method that differs from ours, Wightman performs
a logistic regression on the data for white applicants. She then uses this regression to estimate the
probabilities of admission for all nonwhite applicants, had they been evaluated by the standards
used to evaluate white applicants. She sums these probabilities to estimate the number of nonwhite
applicants who would have been admitted without affirmative action and compares that number to
the actual number of nonwhite applicants accepted in order to compute the number of but-for
admits. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of
the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1997).
The defendants' expert statistician, Stephen Raudenbush, performed calculations that could be
used to compute the number of but-for admits at the College and the Law School. When analyzing
the 1998 College data, for example, Raudenbush first performed a regression to predict the
probability of admission for nonpreferred applicants and then used this regression to predict the
probability of admission for applicants under a race-blind system. Supplemental Expert Report of
Stephen W. Raudenbush at 4, Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (No. 97-CV-75231-DT) [hereinafter
Raudenbush, Supplemental Expert Report (Feb. 24, 2000)], available at
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/research/swrfeb24.pdf. Raudenbush then departed from
Wightman's method and rank-ordered the applicants by their probability of admission and assumed
that the applicants who would have been accepted would have been those at the top of the list; he
used this assumption to estimate the number of preferred minorities who would have been admitted
in the absence of racial preferences. Id. For the results of this analysis, see infra notes 62-72 and
accompanying text.
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range, residency status, and year for each school.5 2 For example, in 1995,
nonpreferred, nonresident Law School applicants with GPAs between 3.50
and 3.74 and LSAT scores between 164 and 166 had a 34% probability of
admission, and preferred minority applicants with otherwise identical
characteristics had a 67% probability of admission. We therefore found that
the probability enhancement for applicants with these characteristics was
33%. We then multiplied the probability enhancement for each combination
of GPA range, test score range, residency status, and year by the number of
preferred minority applicants for that combination to get the number of but-
for admits for that combination. For example, because there were 3 preferred
minority nonresident applicants in 1995 with GPAs between 3.50 and 3.74
and LSAT scores between 164 and 166 and the probability enhancement for
these applicants was 33%, we found that the number of but-for admits with
this combination of GPA range, test score range, residency status, and year
was 1. We summed the number of but-for admits for all combinations in a
given subset of the data to get the total number of but-for admits for that
subset. Finally, we divided the number of but-for admits for a given subset
by the total number of admits for that subset to find the percentage of admits
who were but-for admits for that subset.53
52. If there were no preferred minority applicants or no nonpreferred applicants, we defined the
probability enhancement to be zero.
53. Note that our method will approximate the number of but-for admits only if other
admissions factors-in the aggregate-are distributed evenly across preferred and nonpreferred
applicants for each combination of GPA range, test score range, residency status, and year. Other
individual factors may not be distributed evenly. For example, legacy status may be distributed
unevenly so as to favor white applicants. See, e.g., John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action
Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491, 508 (1993)
(noting that an investigation by the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights found
that legacy preferences at Harvard and Yale disproportionately advantaged white applicants over
Asian American applicants). Athletic ability and experience may be distributed unevenly so as to
favor preferred minority applicants. See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME
OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 55 (2001) (concluding that athletic
preferences increase racial diversity modestly for males-in the study's 1989 cohort, the percentage
of African American males would have "declined ... from 6 percent to 5 percent, if the athletic
contribution to racial diversity had been eliminated"); see also Liu, supra note 44, at 1069 & n. 101
(describing Shulman and Bowen's findings that "although athletics helps promote racial diversity,
the impact is modest" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra, at
55)). Low socioeconomic status may also be distributed unevenly so as to favor preferred minority
applicants. See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 449-50 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998)
(noting that socioeconomic status is distributed unevenly by race among students with SAT scores
in the top ten percent); see also Wightman, supra note 51, at 24-25 & n.51 (finding that
socioeconomic status was distributed unevenly by race among applicants to law school for a sample
of applicants in 1991). If these other factors have a net effect of advantaging either preferred or
nonpreferred applicants, then the differences in admissions rates we observe cannot be attributed
solely to racial preferences. Most admissions factors (such as extracurricular activities and special
talents) are, however, likely distributed evenly among preferred and nonpreferred applicants with
the same GPAs and test scores. And, of the factors that are unevenly distributed, some factors favor
preferred applicants while others favor nonpreferred applicants. Thus, as a first cut, it seems
reasonable to assume that the other factors in combination do not substantially favor either preferred
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Law School data were available to the Court for the years 1995-2000.14
During those years, we calculated that the percentage of admits who were
but-for admits was 10.4%. College data were available to the Court for the
years 1995-1999.56 During those years, we calculated that the percentage of
admits who were but-for admits was 6.7%. 7 The admissions policies at the
College changed between 1995 and 1999,58 and it was only the policy that
the College began using in 1999 that was at issue before the Supreme Court
in Gratz. 59 We calculated that the percentage of admits in 1999 who were
but-for admits was only 4.0%.60 These data are summarized in Table 1.
minority applicants or nonpreferred applicants. Moreover, the Law School represented that "soft"
variables at least do not systematically favor minority applicants. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d
732, 800 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that during oral argument in the Sixth
Circuit, counsel for the Law School "responded with a firm 'no"' when asked, "Do you assert that
under-represented minorities systematically have stronger [soft variables] than non-minority
students?"), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42, at 31 (noting that
comparing admissions rates of African American and white applicants with the same SAT range
could provide a measure of the amount of affirmative action); Liu, supra note 44, at 1070
(concluding that "differences in admission rates based on SAT scores provide a reasonably valid
measure of the admissions advantage black applicants receive through affirmative action");
Wightman, supra note 5 1, at 6-9 (using a model that compared admissions rates for white and
nonwhite applicants with similar LSAT scores and GPAs and noting that it "was built under the
assumption that if race were not a factor in the decisions, patterns of admission decisions observed
for white applicants would also hold for applicants of color").
54. See supra note 50.
55. We found that there were 755 but-for admits and 7,284 total admits. The total number of
minority admits was 921, so the percentage of minority admits who were but-for admits was 82.0%.
56. See supra note 50.
57. We found that there were 3,373 but-for admits and 50,055 total admits. The total number of
minority admits was 6,341, so the percentage of minority admits who were but-for admits was
53.2%.
58. For a summary of the changes, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-57 (2003) and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827-33 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd in part, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
59. The district court struck down the policies in place between 1995 and 1998, and upheld the
policy that was implemented in 1999. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 814. The College's brief explained
why only the policy that was implemented beginning in 1999 was at issue before the Supreme
Court:
The admissions programs governed by the 1995-98 guidelines included three race-
conscious practices that the University undisputedly has discontinued and disavowed:
(1) the use of grids that take race into account by setting forth admissions options for
applicants with various combinations of qualifications; (2) the exemption of minority
students from the practice of rejecting candidates with very low grades and test scores
without counselor review; and (3) a procedure known as "protected seats" that used
projections of expected applications from groups known to apply late in the process
(including minorities) to pace the rolling admissions process to permit consideration of
such applications. The district court concluded that, while the use of grids, standing
alone, was not necessarily unlawful, the combination of the three practices was
impermissible. Petitioners devote much of their brief to attacking these abandoned
admissions practices. However, because the University did not cross-petition to seek
review of the district court's determination that these practices, taken together, were
impermissible, those practices are not properly before this Court.
Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 5 n.7 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court
seemeu to 1int its holding to the policy implemented beginning in 1999. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at
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Table 1
Percentage of admits who were but-for admits
Law School: all years 10.4%
College: all years 6.7%
College: 1999 4.0%
These data demonstrate that on the outcome dimension, the Law School
placed more weight on race than the College. The difference is especially
stark when we compare the two programs actually at issue in the Supreme
Court-the Law School's program for 1995 and subsequent years, and the
College's program for 1999 and subsequent years. For these two programs,
the percentage of admits who were but-for admits is 2.6 times higher at the
Law School than at the College.
Our conclusion that the Law School gave more weight to race than the
College on the outcome dimension is consistent with the analysis of the
University of Michigan's own expert witness, Stephen Raudenbush. While
we did not have access to all of Raudenbush's results, we did have some of
his calculations for the Law School in 1995, 1996, and 2000 and for the
College in 1995, 1996, and 1998.
Raudenbush used two methods to analyze the 1995 and 1996 Law
School data.61  Using those two methods, he calculated that without
affirmative action, the percentage of 1995 Law School admits who were
minorities would have been 3.1% or 6% rather than the actual percentage of
18.3%.62 We would therefore say that the percentage of 1995 Law School
admits who were but-for admits was 15.2% or 12.3%. Raudenbush also
calculated that without affirmative action, the percentage of 1996 Law
School admits who were minorities would have been 4.7% or 5% rather than
the actual percentage of 17.6%.63 We would therefore say that the
271 (noting that the "current... policy does not provide such individualized consideration"
(emphasis added)).
60. We found that there were 445 but-for admits and 11,228 total admits. The total number of
minority admits was 1,228, so the percentage of minority admits who were but-for admits was
36.2%.
61. In his first method, Raudenbush used a mixed model for logistic regression that allowed for
random effects and calculated the percentage of admittees who would have been admitted if the
only factors the Law School considered were GPA, LSAT scores, residency status, and sex.
Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through
Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 492 (2000). In his second method, Raudenbush "placed
[applicants] in cells on a grid based on the conjunction of LSAT scores and [GPAs], and assum[ed]
that the proportion of admitted minorities in a cell would be the proportion of all applicants in the
cell who [were] admitted." Id. at 493.
62. Id. at 492-93.
63. Id.
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percentage of 1996 Law School admits who were but-for admits was 12.9%
or 12.6%.
For the 2000 Law School data, Raudenbush calculated that in the
absence of affirmative action, the number of admits who were minorities
would have been 46 rather than the actual number of 170.64 We would there-
fore say that the number of but-for admits was 124. Using other data
reported in the Grutter district court opinion, we determined that Raudenbush
found that the total number of admits in 2000 was 1,410.65 We would there-
fore say that the percentage of 2000 Law School admits who were but-for
admits was 8.8%.66
Turning to the College, Raudenbush calculated that without affirmative
action, the percentage of 1995 College enrollees who were minorities would
have been 5% rather than the actual percentage of 14.3%.67 Using yield data
available in Raudenbush's expert report, we determined that based on
Raudenbush's calculations, the percentage of admits who were but-for ad-
mits was 7.8%.68
Raudenbush calculated that for the College in 1996, 1,066 minority
applicants were but-for admits.69 Because the total number of admits was
10,363,70 we would say that the percentage of 1996 College admits who were
64. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 839 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
65. The opinion stated that Raudenbush found that without affirmative action, the percentage of
nonminority applicants who were admitted would have been 44% rather than the actual percentage
of 40%. Id. It follows that 4% of the nonminority applicants is equal to 124, the number of but-for
admits. Because 40% of all nonminority applicants were actually admitted, the actual number of
nonminority admits was 1,240. The total number of admits was therefore 1,410, the sum of 1,240
and 170.
66. The district court opinion and the Supreme Court's Grutter opinion reported that when
examining the Law School data for 2000, Raudenbush found that without affirmative action,
minorities would have constituted 4% of the entering class rather than the actual figure of 14.5%.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 839. Using these
figures, we would say that the percentage of enrollees who were but-for admits was 10.5%. Cf
supra note 44 (distinguishing between the percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits and the
percentage of admits who are but-for admits).
67. Raudenbush, Supplemental Expert Report (July 13, 2000), supra note 44, at 3. Using these
figures, we would say that the percentage of enrollees who were but-for admits was 9.3%. Cf
supra note 44 (distinguishing between the percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits and the
percentage of admits who are but-for admits).
68. The expert report provided yield data for several subgroups. See Raudenbush,
Supplemental Expert Report (July 13, 2000), supra note 44, at 11 tbl.3. Using these yield data, we
calculated that the yield for minority applicants was 41.3% and the yield for nonminority applicants
was 33.9%. Raudenbush's calculations suggested that the ratios of the number of but-for minority
enrollees to the number of non-but-for minority enrollees to the number of nonminority enrollees
were 9.3:5:85.7. We used these ratios along with the yield statistics to calculate that the ratios of
the number of but-for minority admits to the number of non-but-for minority admits to the number
of nonminority admits were 22.5:12.1:252.9. Thus, the percentage of admits who were but-for
admits was 7.8%.
69. Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 4 n.5.
70. Id.
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but-for admits was 10.3%. In addition, Raudenbush calculated that without
affirmative action, the percentage of 1998 College admits who were
minorities would have been 6% rather than the actual percentage of 14%. 7 1
We would therefore say that the percentage of 1998 College admits who
were but-for admits was 8%.
These results using Raudenbush's calculations are summarized in Table
2. Comparing the results using Raudenbush's calculations to our results, we
see that the relevant percentages under the former approach are generally
slightly larger than the relevant percentages under the latter approach.
Importantly, however, the results under the two approaches are consistent
with respect to the central inquiry: both show that the percentage of admits
who were but-for admits was generally several percentage points higher at
the Law School than at the College.72
Table 2
Estimate of percentage of admits who were but-for admits using
Raudenbush's calculations
Law School: 1995 12.3% or 15.2%
Law School: 1996 12.6% or 12.9%





The means and outcome dimensions capture different burdens of
affirmative action. The outcome dimension measures the percentage of
applicants who are admitted because of their race, while the means dimen-
sion measures the size of the racial preference needed to admit the average
but-for admit. The simple idea is that holding the number of but-for admits
constant, an admissions program is more burdensome to disfavored
71. Raudenbush, Supplemental Expert Report (Feb. 24, 2000), supra note 51, at 3-5.
72. All percentages for the Law School are greater than all percentages for the College with one
exception: the percentage of 2000 Law School admits who were but-for admits is 8.8% while the
percentage of 1996 College admits who were but-for admits is 10.3%. It is significant, however,
that the Law School percentages are larger than the College percentages for all other pairs of data.
Moreover, the 1996 College program was not before the Court in Gratz; only the program
implemented beginning in 1999 was before the Court. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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applicants if they are passed over because of large racial preferences than
because of small racial preferences.
73
To capture the means dimension, we attempted to measure the effective
GPA boost that preferred minorities received on account of their race.74 For
each school, we modeled admissions decisions with a group probit and pro-
duced an equation that predicted the probability of admission given GPA,
test score, race, residency status, and year.75 We used the coefficients of the
resulting equation to calculate the number of GPA points that being a racial
minority was equivalent to--we called this number the "GPA
enhancement., 76  We calculated that the GPA enhancement at the Law
School was 1.39 points,77 while the GPA enhancement at the College was
73. See Ayres, supra note 21, at 1803-04 (arguing that qualified nonminorities are more
burdened when they lose out to substantially less qualified minorities than to only slightly less
qualified minorities).
74. Some literature has suggested other measures for capturing the weight given to race on what
we have called the means dimension. A common approach is to compare the average test scores of
preferred minority and nonpreferred matriculants. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action:
Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 18-19 (2002) (comparing the differences in
test scores and GPAs between African American and white applicants); see also Liu, supra note 44,
at 1063 & n.79 (criticizing studies that take this approach). As Goodwin Liu points out, however,
differences in average test scores cannot be attributed solely to affirmative action and are therefore
not a good measure of the means dimension. See Liu, supra note 44, at 1064. William Bowen and
Derek Bok propose to capture part of what we call the means dimension by examining the
differential in qualifications between but-for African American admits and white applicants who
would have been admitted in the absence of affirmative action. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42, at
37. Because of problems identifying the white applicants who would have been admitted in the
absence of affirmative action, they propose approximating their credentials with the lowest decile of
white admits. Id. at 37-38. Linda Wightman follows this approach in a study of selective law
schools. See Linda F. Wightman, Are Other Things Essentially Equal? An Empirical Investigation
of the Consequences of Including Race as a Factor in Law School Admission, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 1,
16-25 (1998) (comparing LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs of minorities who would have
been denied admission based on a numbers-only admission model with LSAT scores and
undergraduate GPAs of the lowest ten percent of white students that had been admitted to their
respective schools).
75. For each set of data falling in a particular GPA range and test score range, we assigned the
data a GPA corresponding to the mean of the GPA range and a test score corresponding to the mean
of the test score range. In addition, we dropped data corresponding to combinations that included at
least one of the following: no test score or GPA, or the lowest possible test score range or GPA
range.
76. To compute the GPA enhancement, we divided the minority coefficient by the GPA
coefficient from the group probit.
77. Judge Boggs attempted to estimate the GPA enhancement for the Law School's admissions
program in his dissent from the Sixth Circuit opinion in Grutter. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732,
796 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Examining the 1997 data for
applicants with LSAT scores between 167 and 169, he noted that "under-represented minorities
with a high C to low B undergraduate average are admitted at the same rate as majority applicants
with an A average" and concluded that the Law School's GPA enhancement was over 1 full GPA
point. Id. Using a similar technique, Judge Boggs concluded that the LSAT enhancement was
approximately 11 LSAT points. Id.
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1.02 points for the years 1995-199978 and 0.67 points for 1999. 79  These
results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
Bprobit GPA enhancement (in GPA points)
Law School: all years 1.39
College: all years 1.02
College: 1999 0.67
On the GPA enhancement measure, then, the Law School placed greater
weight on race than the College.8 ' The difference is especially stark when
78. These results are consistent with the results of the plaintiffs' expert, Kinley Lamtz, who
used a different method to compute GPA enhancement for the College in 1995 and 1996. For
combinations of test score ranges, race, and residency status, Larntz computed the lowest GPA with
a probability of admission of greater than fifty percent. Expert Report of Kinley Lamtz at 2, Gratz
v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT). Then, Lamtz
compared these GPAs for preferred and nonpreferred applicants and computed a GPA enhancement
for each test score range. Id. at 3-4. Larntz concluded that the GPA enhancements in 1995 were
approximately 1 GPA point, while the GPA enhancements in 1996 were approximately 1.2 GPA
points. Id. Larntz did not compute GPA enhancements for other years for the College, nor did he
compute GPA enhancements for the Law School.
79. These results are consistent with the results we get when we calculate the GPA
enhancement using a different method in which we examine the point values in the College's point
system. Beginning in 1998, the College assigned each applicant a "selection index." See infra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Applicants could earn up to 80 points for their GPA and 20
points for membership in an underrepresented minority group. See infra note 92. While minorities
could theoretically earn 20 points for their race, not all minorities earned these points for their race.
See infra note 92. This is because the 20 points available for race could be earned on the basis of
many factors such as socioeconomic status and athletic ability, but these points could be earned on
the basis of one-and only one-of these factors. See infra note 92. So, if a racial minority would
have earned 20 points for one of these other factors, then in some sense she did not earn any points
on account of her race. In addition, some minority applicants effectively received fewer than 20
points for their race because applicants could earn no more than 40 points for nonacademic factors,
so if an applicant earned more than 20 points in the other nonacademic factor categories, then she
effectively did not earn the full 20 points for her race. See infra note 92. Minority applicants
therefore received, on average, fewer than 20 points for their race. Because a 4.0 GPA was worth
80 points, we would expect the GPA enhancement to be less than 1 GPA point. Our method
described in the text accompanying this footnote produces a GPA enhancement of 0.67 GPA points,
so the two results are consistent.
80. For a robustness check, we performed the same computations using a logit model rather
than a probit model, and our results were similar:
Logit GPA enhancement (in GPA points)
Law School: all years 1.41
College: all years 1.08
College: 1999 0.70
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we compare the two programs actually at issue in the Supreme Court: the
Law School's program for 1995 and subsequent years, and the College's
program for 1999 and subsequent years. For these two programs, the Law
School's GPA enhancement was more than twice as high as the College's
GPA enhancement.
These results were not robust, however. We found that the College had
a higher normalized test score enhancement than the Law School. 82 It may
be that the GPA enhancement results are not robust because the Law School
and the College weighted GPA and test scores differently. The College
stated that for at least some of the years between 1995 and 1999 it weighted
GPA much more heavily than test scores, 83 and if the Law School weighted
81. The GPA enhancement measure probably underestimates the amount of weight placed on
race at the Law School relative to the College because the Law School likely weighted academic
factors more heavily than the College. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42, at 25 (noting that
compared to undergraduate institutions, "[p]rofessional schools place little emphasis on assembling
a diversity of talents for the sake of enriching extracurricular life" and observing that "law
schools ... place the greatest weight on the traditional measures of academic achievement").
82. We normalized test score data on a 1,000-point scale and found the following results:
Test score enhancement on
normalized scale Test score enhancement in SAT
(out of 1,000 points) or LSAT point units
Law School: all years 209 12.5 LSAT points
College: all years 604 725 SAT points
College: 1999 665 798 SAT points
These data suggest the College gave minority applicants a bigger boost than the Law School, and
the 1999 College policy provided an even bigger boost to minorities than earlier College policies.
Note that a large SAT point boost is consistent with the point system that was in effect starting in
1998 at the College, which awarded applicants up to 20 points for being a racial minority and up to
12 points for SAT scores. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. The 20 points minorities
could earn for race correspond to 2,000 SAT points. Given that not all minorities could earn all 20
points for race, we would expect the SAT enhancement to be less than 2,000 SAT points. See supra
note 79.
We also note that the Law School minority coefficient was higher than the College minority
coefficient for 1999, but lower than the College minority coefficient for 1995-1999. The raw
minority coefficients were as follows:
Minority coefficient
Law School: all years 2.75
College: all years 2.99
College: 1999 2.06
These data suggest that during 1995-1999, the College gave minority applicants a bigger boost than
the Law School, but that the 1999 College policy gave minority applicants a smaller boost than the
Law School.
83. In the point system the College began using in 1998, applicants could earn up to 80 points
for their GPA but only 12 points for their test scores. See infra notes 90, 92.
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test scores more heavily than GPAs (or at least weighted test scores and
GPAs differently), then the differential weighting could explain the non-
robustness of the results.
In order to account for the possibly differential weighting of GPA and
test scores, we could construct a single measure of these two academic
criteria that takes account of this differential weighting. Richard Sander has
taken steps towards creating such a measure. Sander created an "index
formula" for each school, which assigns an index score from 0 to 1,000
points for every combination of GPA and test score.84 Sander then used
these index formulas to estimate what we would call the "index
enhancement" for each school.85 Sander found that in 1999 there was a 140-
point index enhancement at the Law School and a 120-point index enhance-
ment at the College.86 While Sander's method has several flaws, 87 his results
are at the very least consistent with the proposition that the Law School
granted greater racial preferences than the College on the means dimension.
On net, then, there is strong evidence supported by both our empiricism
and the University of Michigan's own expert that a higher proportion of
admits were admitted because of their race at the Law School than at the
College. Thus, on the outcome dimension, the Law School's affirmative ac-
tion program was more extensive. And on the means dimension, there is
some (but weaker) evidence that the racial preferences were larger at the Law
School. A reasonable trier of fact might have concluded that both the means
and outcome dimensions suggested greater racial preferences at the Law
School than at the College.
So, the admissions program the Court upheld in Grutter may have
placed more weight on race than the admissions program it struck down in
Gratz. This result is surprising because, all other things being equal, we
would not expect the Court to uphold an admissions program with racial
84. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REv. 367, 402 tbl.2.1, 405 tbl.2.2 (2004).
85. Id. at 402-05.
86. Id.
87. Sander's method suffered from three principal flaws. First, Sander was not comparing the
same groups at the Law School and the College. Instead, he compared nonpreferred and preferred
minority nonresidents at the College, id. at 401-02, and white and African American applicants
(residents and nonresidents) at the Law School, id. at 404-05. Second, while Sander ran a logistic
regression on the College data to create an index formula for the College, id. at 402 tbl.2.1, he did
not run his own regression on the Law School data to come up with an index formula for the Law
School. Instead, he used an index formula that he says is typical of law schools, and thus it is
unclear how well the index formula he used for the Law School is a good match for the data. 1d. at
405 tbl.2.2. Third, Sander estimated the index point enhancement figure by eyeballing the data-he
created tables that showed that, at several different ranges of index scores, there was a 140-point
difference at the Law School and a 120-point difference at the College. Id. at 402-05. He does not
use more sophisticated analysis such as a group probit to determine if these observed differences are
characteristic of the data as a whole. When we ran a group probit on the data Sander examined in
his tables, we found that the Law School had a 141-point enhancement and the College had a 160-
point enhancement.
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preferences that are greater than those of an admissions program it has struck
down. Under the minimum necessary preference requirement of the old
strict scrutiny, the Law School would have needed to show why these larger
preferences were necessary. Relatedly, the College would have needed to
make a lesser showing for why its smaller preferences were necessary.
While the differences in the sizes of the preferences do not demonstrate that
the outcomes of the cases were wrong, they at least raise the question of
whether the greater preferences at the Law School were justified by the
benefits. The Court should have engaged in a cost-benefit calculus in order
to answer this question. As we will show in the next Part, however, the
Court conducted no such inquiry.
IV. Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court jettisoned the minimum necessary
preference requirement and replaced it with a watered-down
"individualization" requirement, and in so doing, the Court ignored a
central-and important-feature of pre-Grutter and Gratz narrow tailoring
jurisprudence. Subpart A of this Part describes the admissions programs at
issue in Grutter and Gratz and then argues that the narrow tailoring inquiry
in Grutter and Gratz boiled down to an inquiry into whether the programs
were individualized. Subpart B describes three possible meanings of this
"individualized consideration" requirement, and subpart C examines how
these meanings fit together.
A. Admissions Programs and the Individualized Consideration Requirement
The two admissions programs at issue in Grutter and Gratz both
considered a range of academic and nonacademic factors, including race and
ethnicity, and sought to admit student bodies that were not only academically
strong, but also diverse along many dimensions.8 8  The two admissions
programs, however, used different mechanisms for making admissions
decisions. The Court described the Law School's admissions program as
conducting a "flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences, and
potential to contribute to the learning of those around them.",8 9 In contrast,
the College utilized a point system to aid admissions counselors in deciding
88. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 313-16 (2003) (noting the Law School policy's
focus on grades, test scores, and "other criteria that are important to the Law School's educational
objectives"); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253 (2003) (summarizing the admissions factors
considered by the College); Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003
WL 402236 [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Grutter] (noting that while the Law School's
admissions program considered race as a factor, the program's "hallmark [was] a focus on academic
capabilities coupled with a flexible assessment of every individual applicant's talents, experiences
and potential to contribute to the learning of those around them" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 5-10 (describing the admissions factors
considered by the College).
89. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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whom to admit. 90 An admissions counselor read each application and
assigned it a score, called the "selection index," based on predetermined
point values for various characteristics. 9' Applicants could earn up to 110
points for academic factors and up to 40 points for nonacademic factors, in-
cluding 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented racial group.92
With some exceptions, the admissions office used these selection index
scores to determine whether to admit, reject, or postpone decision on
applicants.93  Admissions counselors who believed that the selection index
score may not have accurately reflected the potential contributions of an ap-
plicant could "flag" the application for in-depth review by a separate
committee, which made decisions without regard to the selection index
score.
94
In Gratz, the Court held that the College's program, unlike the Law
School's program, was not narrowly tailored to the diversity interest because
it did not provide "individualized consideration. 95  Not only was the
individualized consideration factor the dispositive one in these two cases, but
also it is essentially the only dispositive factor in all higher education
affirmative action admissions cases, at least for the near future. Robert Post
90. The College used the point system in 1998 and subsequent years. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at
255.
91. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
92. Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 7, 9. The 110 points for academic factors
were available as follows: 80 points for tenth and eleventh grade GPA, 12 points for standardized
test scores, 10 points for "academic strength of... high school," and 8 points for a rigorous course
of study. Id. at 7-8. The 40 points for nonacademic factors were available as follows: 10 points for
Michigan residents, 6 points for being from an underrepresented Michigan county, 2 points for
being from an underrepresented state, 4 points for children of an alumnus or 1 point for close
relative of an alumnus, 3 points for outstanding essay, 5 points for leadership or public service, 5
points for personal achievement, and 20 points for one and only one of five characteristics or
factors--(1) socioeconomic disadvantage, (2) membership in an underrepresented minority group,
(3) predominantly minority or socioeconomically disadvantaged high school, (4) athletic
recruitment, and (5) provost's discretion. In calculating the selection index, a maximum of 40
points could come from these nonacademic factors, even if a student earned more than 40 points in
the preceding categories. Id. at 8-9. The College considered "African-Americans, Hispanics, and
Native Americans" to be underrepresented minorities for purposes of their admissions policy.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253-54.
93. The majority opinion in Gratz stated that "[t]his index was divided linearly into ranges
generally calling for admissions dispositions as follows: 100-150 (admit); 95-99 (admit or
postpone); 90-94 (postpone or admit); 75-89 (delay or postpone); 74 and below (delay or reject)."
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. The brief for the University of Michigan stated that "[t]o avoid
overenrollment, [the College] sets and adjusts, when necessary, the selection index levels that
trigger the three possible admissions outcomes-admittance, deferral, and denial." Brief for
Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 10.
94. The admissions counselor could "flag" an application as long as the applicant met three
criteria. The applicant must: (1) have been academically prepared; (2) have had a selection index of
at least 75 for nonresidents of Michigan and 80 for residents of Michigan; and (3) have "possess[ed]
at least one of a variety of qualities or characteristics important to the University's composition of
its freshman class." Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 10.
95. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271; see also Post, supra note 20, at 70 (stating that the Court used the
individualized consideration requirement to strike down the admissions program in Gratz).
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has noted that the Grutter Court held that in order for an admissions program
to be narrowly tailored, the program:
(1) must "not unduly harm members of any racial group"; (2) can be
implemented only if there has been a "serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve
the diversity the university seeks"; (3) "must be limited in time"; and
(4) must afford each applicant "truly individualized consideration." 96
At least for the near future, however, it is necessary for universities to
show they fulfill only the last of these four requirements. The Grutter Court
noted that a program that provides individualized consideration automatically
does not unduly harm members of racial groups not receiving a preference, 97
thus making the first of these four requirements redundant with the fourth.
Grutter further held that there were no workable race-neutral alternatives at
the University of Michigan Law School98 and would probably find likewise
at other institutions of higher education, therefore taking the bite out of the
second of these four requirements. And finally, while the Court took the
third requirement of a time limitation seriously, it acknowledged that af-
firmative action will be necessary for the near future to achieve diversity in
universities, 99 and so for at least the next twenty-five years or so,'00 the third
requirement will be deemed to be filled with little or no showing on the part
of universities. Therefore, all that remains of narrow tailoring analysis is the
individualized consideration requirement.
While the Court was clear that the narrow tailoring inquiry in the higher
education admissions context boils down to an individualized consideration
inquiry, it was not clear about what it meant by "individualized
consideration." Indeed, not only are scholars puzzled about what the Court
meant by individualized consideration,' 0 ' but also at least one Supreme Court
96. Post, supra note 20, at 67 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341, 339, 342,
334); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en bane) (listing five "hallmarks" of a narrowly tailored affirmative action program: the
four listed by Post and a "no-quotas" hallmark, which Post presumably folded into the
individualized consideration hallmark), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
97. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 ("[I]n the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible
diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.").
98. Id. at 340 ("[T]he Law School sufficiently considered workable race-neutral alternatives.").
99. Id. at 342 (noting that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time" and that
"the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies
and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student
body diversity").
100. Id. at 343 ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
101. See, e.g., Post, supra note 20, at 70-71 ("[T]he Court never makes clear whether the
Michigan undergraduate program fails the individualized consideration requirement because it
quantifies the contribution of race to diversity by 'a specific and identifiable' measure, or instead
because the program employs a measure that is 'decisive."' (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 271 (2003)); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
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Justice is uncertain about what the Court requires with respect to
individualized consideration.1 0 2  The next two subparts examine what the
Court meant by the individualized consideration requirement: subpart B de-
scribes three possible meanings of the requirement, and subpart C analyzes
how these meanings fit together.
B. Three Meanings of the Individualized Consideration Requirement
Representative of the confusion over what satisfies the individualized
consideration requirement is Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement in Gratz
declaring that the College's admissions program was not narrowly tailored:
"[w]e find that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every
single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that respon-
dents claim justifies their program." 10 3  In this statement, Chief Justice
Rehnquist alluded to three possible grounds for objecting to the College's
admissions program. Was the admissions program problematic because it
quantified the admissions process? Or, was the complaint that the program
was not nuanced and did not differentiate among individual minority
applicants, "automatically" distributing 20 points "to every single
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race"?'0 4
Alternatively, was the objection that the weight given to race was
excessive-"one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission"? 10 5
The ambiguities in Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement-and in the pair
of opinions when read in their entireties-point to three possible meanings of
the individualized consideration requirement.' 0 6  First, the Court could be
HARV. L. REV. 493, 561 (2003) ("Exactly what it means to treat applicants as individuals is, and
will surely continue to be, a contested question. After Grutter, individual treatment can include
some consideration of race, though it is difficult to say how much and what kind.").
102. Justice Souter noted that the majority objected either to "the use of points to quantify and
compare characteristics, or to the number of points awarded due to race." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295
(Souter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 270 (majority opinion).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Robert Post reads the opinions as susceptible to two, rather than three, interpretations of
what satisfies the individualized consideration requirement. His first interpretation seems to be a
combination of our first and second interpretations; his second interpretation maps onto our third
interpretation:
Gratz offers two distinct accounts of the individualized consideration requirement.
It states, on the one hand, that the requirement is inconsistent with any program in
which "any single characteristic automatically ensure[s] a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university's diversity." But it also notes, on the other hand, that the
Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program is unconstitutional because the
"automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making 'the factor of
race.., decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant."
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requiring racial preferences that are not quantified. Second, the Court could
be requiring racial preferences that are not undifferentiated. That is, the
Court may be requiring that universities not give all individual minority ap-
plicants the same amount of preference on account of their race. Third, the
Court might be requiring racial preferences that are not excessive.
We might make progress in distinguishing among these three meanings
by thinking about an admissions office at least implicitly using a formula or
algorithm in deciding whether to admit particular applicants. Given that ad-
missions decisions are, as Justice Souter put it, "not left entirely to
inarticulate intuition,"'10 7 admissions decisions can be conceived of as being
modeled as a formula whose inputs are all of the variables the admissions
officers consider when deciding whom to admit and whose output is the
zero-one decision to reject or admit. Of course, given the complexity of ad-
missions decisions, such a formula would likely be extremely complicated,
and it might contain subjective evaluations as part of its components. But
conceiving of an admissions process as a decisionmaking formula with dif-
ferent weights given to different factors helps clarify what the Court might
have meant by individualized consideration.
The "no quantified preferences" meaning focuses on whether a program
employs an explicit formula with quantified weights showing the relative
importance of different qualifications. The "differentiated preferences"
meaning examines whether the formula used is sufficiently sophisticated-
that is, whether the implicit formula is linear or nonlinear with respect to the
race variable and whether it involves the right variables. A formula with dif-
ferentiated preferences would have minority interaction terms that had the
effect of granting larger or smaller preferences to distinct subclasses of
minorities. The "no excessive preferences" meaning looks at whether the
coefficients in the formula are such that race does not receive too much
weight. So, viewed through the lens of a formula, the offense of the under-
graduate program might be either that it had known weights, invariant
weights, or excessive weights.
The following sections examine each of these three meanings and the
extent to which the opinions suggest that the meanings are part of the
individualized consideration inquiry. Subpart C then discusses how these
three meanings fit together.
1. Quantified Racial Preferences.-Many scholars have read the
Grutter and Gratz Courts to have held that the individualized consideration
requirement precludes--or places severe limits on-the use of a point system
Post, supra note 20, at 70 (alteration in original) (omission in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271, 272).
107. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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in which universities assign race 1°8 a numerical value. 10 9 This section will
examine the extent to which the Court meant to proscribe quantified admis-
sions programs.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Gratz frequently and
disparagingly referred to the point system used by the College, but most of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's complaints had to do not with attributes that all
point systems have, but rather with particular attributes specific to the point
system employed by the College. Indeed, there are only two places in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist might be said to attack the point system qua point
system directly. First, he stated the following:
The current LSA policy does not provide such individualized
consideration. The LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 points
to every single applicant from an "underrepresented minority" group,
as defined by the University. The only consideration that
accompanies this distribution of points is a factual review of an
application to determine whether an individual is a member of one of
these minority groups.' 10
This critique can be read as an attack on the point system itself in that it
found fault with the lack of consideration that accompanied the distribution
108. Even after Grutter and Gratz, it appears that a university could still employ a nonracial
point system-that is, a point system that does not directly assign points on the basis of race-as
part of its process for selecting students. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir.
2004) (upholding a law school admissions program that assigned applicants an index score on the
basis of their grades and test scores). As Reva Siegel has pointed out, "[a]pplicants who are
evaluated as individuals can be categorized and valued on the basis of any trait (for example,
grades, standardized test scores, parental income, residence, high school, alumni affiliations, or
musical or athletic ability) except race." Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassifcation Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1540
n.240 (2004). Indeed, if the Court meant to make even nonracial point systems unconstitutional,
then use of GPAs and standardized test scores would presumably not be allowed, as they assign
points to reflect particular attributes.
109. For example, Robert George explains the difference between the outcomes of Grutter and
Gratz as turning on the point system qua point system. Robert P. George, Grutter and Gratz: Some
Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 1634 (2003) ("The admissions policy of the
undergraduate college, which formally awarded valuable 'points' to certain candidates based on
race and ethnicity, was judged to fail the test of narrow tailoring; the Law School's policy of taking
race and ethnicity into account without the formal awarding of points was judged to pass." (footnote
omitted)); see also Marvin Krislov, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Value, the Method,
and the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 903 (2004) ("Although [the College's] system, like the law
school, did not employ quotas or set-asides, the Court found the weighting of race 'mechanistic' and
,automatic,' and thus concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored."); Post, supra note 20,
at 70-71 ("The upshot is that the Court never makes clear whether the Michigan undergraduate
program fails the individualized consideration requirement because it quantifies the contribution of
race to diversity by 'a specific and identifiable' measure, or instead because the program employs a
measure that is 'decisive."' (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271)); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2006) (noting that in Gratz, "[t]he Court did not rule
that the twenty points [awarded for race] were too high; it ruled instead that a point system, in the
context of racial preference, is invalid as such").
110. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72. "LSA" refers to the College, which is called the College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts. Id. at 251.
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of points for race. It can also be read, however, as an attack on the lack of
differentiation in the point system; perhaps if consideration of other factors
accompanied the distribution of points for race the point system would not be
as problematic.
In the other place in which Chief Justice Rehnquist might be said to
have attacked the point system qua point system, he asserted that "[t]he
admissions program Justice Powell described.. . did not contemplate that
any single characteristic automatically ensured a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university's diversity.""1 Insofar as point systems, by their
nature, assign "specific and identifiable" points for race, any point system
may not have passed muster for Chief Justice Rehnquist. 12 Chief Justice
Rehnquist may, however, have allowed a more nuanced point system that
assigned points not on the basis of race alone, but rather on the basis of how
race interacted with other characteristics. Such a system would not assign a
specific and identifiable number of points to a single characteristic and there-
fore may pass constitutional muster. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist was
unclear about whether the Court prohibits quantification or merely requires
differentiation.
In her concurrence in Gratz, Justice O'Connor argued more forcefully
against the point system qua point system. She stated that "the selection
index, by setting up automatic, predetermined point allocations for the soft
variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants cannot be in-
dividually assessed."'1 3  Furthermore, she noted that "this mechanized
selection index score, by and large, automatically determines the admissions
decision for each applicant. The selection index thus precludes admissions
counselors from conducting the type of individualized consideration the
Court's opinion in Grutter requires."
' 14
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter also condemned the
mechanical nature of the point system. She noted that "[u]nlike the program
at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Law School awards no mechanical, prede-
termined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."115 She continued,
stating, "[a]s Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized con-
sideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.
'16
Like Chief Justice Rehnquist's critique, Justice O'Connor's critiques in
Grutter and Gratz can be read either as critiques of the Gratz admissions
111. Id. at271.
112. Of course, one might respond to Chief Justice Rehnquist by noting that just because a
point system assigns the same number of points to each preferred minority applicant, it does not
embody the notion that race "automatically ensure[s] a specific and identifiable contribution to a
university's diversity." Id. Rather, such a system stands for the notion that, on average, minority
students will contribute to the diversity of the student body on account of their race.
113. Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 277 (citation omitted).
115. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 334.
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system's quantification or as critiques of the Gratz admissions system's lack
of differentiation.' 17
Thus, when read together, the opinions make clear that at the very least,
the Court was suspicious of simple point systems like the one used by the
College. Whether the Court objected to these point systems because of their
quantification or because of their lack of differentiation (or whether the Court
thought no quantified system could provide sufficient differentiation) is less
clear. Either way, it is clear that the Court was bothered by quantification,
and we will argue in subpart C that the Court adopted an approach of sub-
jecting quantified systems to scrutiny that is more rigorous than the scrutiny
to which it will subject unquantified systems.
The discussion so far in this section has addressed possible concerns the
Court may have had with quantified admissions programs, but do the Court's
concerns extend also to quantifiable admissions programs? Imagine, for
example, that a statistician collected information about the applicants to the
Law School and came up with a formula for predicting whether applicants
would be admitted that is a function of test scores, GPAs, residency status,
race, strength of recommendations, extracurricular activities, and so on. If
the statistician could perform a regression that fit the data well, the regression
would demonstrate that the program quantified the admissions process, albeit
implicitly.
To satisfy a "not quantifiable" meaning of the individualized
consideration requirement would mean that preferences could not be ex post
recoverable by a regression or other statistical method. Perversely, narrow
tailoring under this reading would require a statistical "badness of fit. '1 18 If a
statistician after the fact could extract the true size and form of the racial
preferences relative to other factors, this might be enough to subject an af-
firmative action program to higher scrutiny.
The regression we conducted on the Law School data was a better fit to
the data than the regression we conducted on the College data. The pseudo-
R-squared statistics are summarized in Table 4.
117. Justice Souter's Gratz dissent provides clues as to whether the majority meant to prohibit
quantification. He noted that the Court's "objection goes to the use of points to quantify and
compare characteristics, or to the number of points awarded due to race, but on either reading the
objection is mistaken." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting). In other words, he
interpreted the Court to be taking a position against either quantification or excessive weight.
118. To be sure, narrow tailoring was originally meant to focus on the closeness of fit between
the means and ends of affirmative action, while a possible statistical badness of fit requirement
refers to a disjunct between the qualifications of an applicant and her probability of being admitted.
Badness of fit in this statistical sense suggests the degree to which randomness or unknown
variables are driving admissions behavior. But it would still be perverse if a generalized disjunct
between qualifications and admission might add to the constitutionality of a program.
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Table 4
Pseudo-R-squared: bprobit Pseudo-R-squared: blogit
Law School: all years 0.4904 0.4994
College: all years 0.4623 0.4667
College: 1999 0.4361 0.4382
The data demonstrate that, despite using no explicit formula, it appears
that the Law School may have been more formulaic than the College. The
pseudo-R-squared statistics suggest that 49% or 50% of the variance in the
Law School admission decisions could be explained by race, GPA, test
scores, residency status, and year, while only 44% to 47% of the undergradu-
ate decisions could be explained by the same factors.' 19
The Supreme Court has not, at least for now, imposed a "not
quantifiable" requirement. In Grutter, the Court did not inquire into whether
the Law School's implicit admissions algorithm could be recovered after the
fact by statistical analysis. And the constitutionality of the Law School's
admission process was not jeopardized by the facts that it (1) was possibly
more formulaic than the College's, and (2) gave more weight to race than the
College in that it produced a larger proportion of admits who were but-for
admits and probably gave racial minorities a greater effective boost as
measured in GPA points or similar units. Quantifiable but unquantified
programs may sail under the radar screen of constitutional review. Indeed,
this difference between quantified and quantifiable programs is consonant
with our larger thesis about the "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" ramifications of
Grutter and Gratz. So long as a decisionmaker does not tell in the sense of
quantifying the relative weights placed on race and nonrace factors, the
Supreme Court will be loath to ask whether the weights were reasonable.
2. Undifferentiated Racial Preferences.-Chief Justice Rehnquist's
complaints about the point system in Gratz, discussed in the previous section,
alternatively can be read as complaints that the point system was not nuanced
enough in that it did not sufficiently differentiate among minority applicants.
So, rather than--or in addition to-the no quantification meaning of indi-
vidualized consideration, the Court may have been adopting a "no
undifferentiated preferences" meaning.120 This section will discuss the extent
119. Cf Sander, supra note 84, at 406 (finding that 88% of admissions outcomes can be
correctly predicted for the Law School in 1999 on the basis of academic factors and race, while only
82% of admissions outcomes can be correctly predicted for the College in 1999 on the basis of
academic factors, race, and residency status).
120. Some scholars have suggested that the Court's main concern was that admissions systems
be sufficiently nuanced. See, e.g., Michael Rosman, Uncertain Direction: The Legacy of Gratz and
Grutter, JURIST LEGAL INTELLIGENCE F., Sept. 5, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-
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to which the Grutter and Gratz opinions suggest that the Court meant to
adopt this meaning.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Gratz noted that
"[t]he admissions program Justice Powell described .. . did not contemplate
that any single characteristic automatically ensured a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university's diversity" 121 and then concluded that the
College's admissions system did not provide individualized consideration
because it "automatically distribute[d] 20 points to every single applicant
from an 'underrepresented minority' group. 122  Chief Justice Rehnquist
illustrated his concern with an example from Justice Powell's Bakke opinion
concerning what would happen in the admissions process to two hypothetical
applicants, A and B, where A was "the child of a successful black physician
in an academic community with promise of superior academic performance"
and B was "a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate par-
ents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated
energy and leadership as well as an apparently-abiding interest in black
power. 1 23 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the College's admissions sys-
tem was not an "individualized selection process" because admissions
officers would not consider the "differing backgrounds, experiences, and
characteristics" of A and B but "would simply award both A and B 20 points
because their. applications indicate that they are African-American. 1 24 So,
for Chief Justice Rehnquist, it appears that any one particular characteristic-
at least, when that characteristic is race-cannot have a predetermined,
aa/rosman.php (implying that the lack of nuance might have been a fatal flaw of the College
program). Robert Post's discussion of the individualized consideration requirement notes two
possible meanings of individualized consideration, and it is unclear whether Post sees his first
interpretation as consistent with what we have called the quantification meaning or the
differentiation meaning. See Post, supra note 20, at 70-71 ("The upshot is that the Court never
makes clear whether the Michigan undergraduate program fails the individualized consideration
requirement because it quantifies the contribution of race to diversity by 'a specific and identifiable'
measure, or instead because the program employs a measure that is 'decisive."' (quoting Gratz, 539
U.S. at 271)).
121. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
124. Id. at 273. This example demonstrates that Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to be bothered
by the fact that the College made no distinctions on class grounds among minority applicants.
Indeed, he was correct that the point system itself operated in this way. As described supra in note
92, applicants could earn 20 points for race or low socioeconomic status, but not both. Had the
point system allowed applicants to earn points for both race and low socioeconomic status, then
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns would seemingly be alleviated. Note that this illustrates that a
point system can differentiate among racial minorities and award a constant number of points to
race as long as it also awards points for the other relevant dimensions. Thus, an award of a constant
amount of points for race-does not necessarily indicate that a system is undifferentiated.
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constant weight; rather, it must be evaluated in the context of other
characteristics.125
Justice O'Connor's Gratz concurrence shows she, too, is concerned
about differentiation. She stated that "the type of individualized
consideration" the Court "requires [is] consideration of each applicant's
individualized qualifications, including the contribution each individual's
race or ethnic identity will make to the diversity of the student body, taking
into account diversity within and among all racial and ethnic groups."'
12 6
She also complained that the College's admissions office assigned "every
underrepresented minority applicant the same, automatic 20-point bonus
without consideration of the particular background, experiences, or qualities
of each individual applicant."' 127  She contrasted the "automatic, predeter-
mined point allocations" in the admissions program of the College with the
admissions program at the Law School, which "enable[d] admissions officers
to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each applicant
[was] likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class." 128 So, like Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor wants to assign preference to race only
in conjunction with consideration of other factors.
Finally, Justice Thomas's concurrence in Gratz also echoes the
differentiation principle, stating that "[t]he LSA policy falls ... because it
does not sufficiently allow for the consideration of nonracial distinctions
among underrepresented minority applicants.' ' 129 Justice Thomas then made
explicit a point that was not addressed in the Court's opinion and was
implicit in Justice O'Connor's opinion-that universities should seek
diversity not only within the group of underrepresented minorities but also
within the group of applicants who are not underrepresented minorities.13
0
125. To the extent that these opinions suggest that one's race can be considered only in context
with other characteristics, they raise several questions. First, what other characteristics must
universities consider when deciding the amount of preference to give in conjunction with race?
Chief Justice Rehnquist's example implied that class and parental education are factors that should
be considered, but what other factors are relevant? Second, and related, how is it decided which
combinations of race and other characteristics receive more preference than others? We will argue
in section V(B)(1) that admissions programs should favor combinations that promote the goals of
the diversity interest of (1) creating a lively campus atmosphere with robust discussions by people
of diverse backgrounds; (2) breaking down racial stereotypes; and (3) ensuring that education, the
pathway to leadership, is open to people of all races. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the goals of the diversity interest.
126. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 276-77.
128. Id. at 279.
129. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130. Id. ("An admissions policy, however, must allow for consideration of these nonracial
distinctions among applicants on both sides of the single permitted racial classification."). Justice
Thomas is the only Justice in Gratz to address expressly the issue of whether it is permissible to
consider racial distinctions among applicants who are members of underrepresented racial minority
groups. Justice Thomas stated emphatically that "[u]nder today's decisions, a university may not
racially discriminate between the groups constituting the critical mass." Id. Some of the Grutter
opinions also addressed this issue, at least tangentially. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
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Read together, these opinions suggest that the Court is particularly
concerned with undifferentiated racial preferences-admissions programs
must seek diversity within the class of underrepresented minorities (and
perhaps within the group of applicants who are not underrepresented
minorities). 131 It should be noted, however, that Grutter and Gratz differ in
their treatment of differentiation in one key respect. The Gratz Court dem-
onstrated that the College's admissions program was not sufficiently
differentiated by pointing to the mechanical nature of the point system and
the fact that all minorities received the same number of points regardless of
their other characteristics.
In contrast, the Grutter opinion contained much lofty language about
the importance of nuance and differentiation, but it came up short on pointing
to evidence that the Law School's admissions program actually operated in a
nuanced way. 32 Instead, the Grutter Court simply took the Law School at its
word that its admissions program was nuanced, citing only the Law School's
admissions policies to support the proposition that the admissions system
operated in a nuanced fashion. 133 While the Grutter Court cited statistics that
it claimed illustrated that the Law School "frequently" admitted nonpreferred
applicants with lower credentials than preferred minorities it rejected,134 such
statistics say nothing about whether preferences granted to minorities were
differentiated; they merely demonstrate that the Law School afforded weight
to factors other than race. Thus, the most that can be said about the Law
374-75 & n. 12 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I join the Court's
opinion insofar as it confirms that.., racial discrimination [among the group of minorities
receiving a preference] remains unlawful."); id. at 381-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
the percentage of each racial group admitted to the Law School is close to the percentage of each
racial group that applied and arguing that the data demonstrated that there was "substantially
different treatment among the three underrepresented minority groups").
13 1. One circuit court case decided since Grutter and Gratz also suggested that differentiation
is a consideration when determining whether admissions programs are narrowly tailored. See Smith
v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 375-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a law school's consideration
of "ethnicity substantiation letter[s]," in which applicants explain the role race or ethnicity has
played in their lives, "supports rather than undermines the constitutionality of the Law School's
program" because the letters allow the law school to "give more weight to those minority candidates
who ha[ve] more to contribute to the diversity of the classroom").
132. For example, the Court stated that "the Law School engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational environment." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. Later, the Court
stated that "the Law School's admissions policy 'is flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on
the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight."' Id.
(quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J.)). The Court
continued, saying that the "Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures
that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside
race in admissions decisions." Id.
133. Id. at 337-39; cf infra note 179 and accompanying text.
134. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. Not only does this statistic fail to support the proposition
that the Law School's admissions program was sufficiently nuanced, but also it fails to measure the
extent to which the Law School placed weight on race. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(d).
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School's admissions program is that its racial preferences were potentially
differentiated; no evidence was offered that the preferences were actually
differentiated. On the ground then, Grutter and Gratz at most require poten-
tial differentiation of racial preferences across the class of preferred
applicants.
3. Excessive Racial Preferences.-Many scholars have interpreted the
Grutter and Gratz Courts to be saying that to satisfy the individualized
consideration requirement, universities cannot give excessive weight to
race.135 This section reviews the parts of the Grutter and Gratz opinions that
suggest that the Court meant for a weight inquiry to be part of the individu-
alized consideration inquiry and describes the ways the Court thought it
should measure whether a university has placed too much weight on race.
While this section is descriptive only, we offer a normative critique of these
methods for measuring weight in section V(A)(2). This section analyzes
each case separately because the Court engaged in a different weight inquiry
in each case.
a. The Gratz Measures of Excessiveness.-The opinion for the
Court in Gratz suggested three different methods for measuring whether
universities give race too much weight, two of which attempt to measure
weight on what we have called the "means dimension" and one of which
attempts to measure weight on what we have called the "outcome
dimension."
135. Robert Post states that the Court is "ambiguous" about the meaning of individualized
consideration. He reads the Court to be offering two "accounts of the individualized consideration
requirement," one of which is the excessive preferences meaning. Post, supra note 20, at 70-71
("The upshot is that the Court never makes clear whether the Michigan undergraduate program fails
the individualized consideration requirement because it quantifies the contribution of race to
diversity by 'a specific and identifiable' measure, or instead because the program employs a
measure that is 'decisive."' (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271)). Lani Guinier and Richard Primus
agree that the weight inquiry was important to the Court, but they are silent as to whether they read
the Court's weight inquiry to be part of the individualized consideration inquiry. Guinier states that
the cases mean that "as long as institutions do not weight race so heavily that it overdetermines
admissions outcomes, their good faith is essentially presumed." Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court,
2002 Term-Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 198 (2003). According to Primus, the cases stand for
the proposition that "universities can prefer members of racially disadvantaged groups as long as the
value of the racial preference is, inter alia, not too large as compared to the value of other
admissions criteria." Primus, supra note 101, at 548. Primus emphasizes this point:
In Grutter and Gratz... the validity of the University of Michigan's affirmative action
plans turned substantially on the relative importance of the racial criterion for
admission as compared to other admissions factors. Where the Court found race to be
predominant, it disallowed affirmative action. Where it found the racial motive to be
merely one factor among several, the Court permitted affirmative action.
Id. at 547 (footnote omitted); see also Mark W. Cordes, Affirmative Action After Grutter and Gratz,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 691, 715-16 (2004) (observing that a weight inquiry was part of the
individualized consideration inquiry).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's first measure along the means dimension
compares the number of points the university assigns to race with the number
of points it assigns to other characteristics. Chief Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested this measure in a discussion of the example from Justice Powell's
Bakke decision comparing three hypothetical applicants, A, B, and C, where
A and B are black and C is "a white student with extraordinary artistic
talent."'136 Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed what would happen to students
A, B, and C under the College's point system:
Even if student C's "extraordinary artistic talent" rivaled that of Monet
or Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points under the
LSA's system. At the same time, every single underrepresented
minority applicant, including students A and B, would automatically
receive 20 points for submitting an application. Clearly, the LSA's
system does not offer applicants the individualized selection process
described in Harvard's example. Instead of considering how the
differing backgrounds, experiences, and characteristics of students A,
B, and C might benefit the University, admissions counselors
reviewing LSA applications would simply award both A and B 20
points because their applications indicate that they are African-
American, and student C would receive up to 5 points for his
"extraordinary talent." 137
This passage suggests that the relative weights of the points bothered
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and it implies that he viewed the weight inquiry to
be relevant to the individualized consideration inquiry. Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not, however, offer a theory for evaluating when race is given
too much weight on this measure. 138
Chief Justice Rehnquist's second measure along the means dimension
compares the number of points assigned to race with the total number of
points needed to gain admission. In the part of the opinion where Chief
Justice Rehnquist announced that the admissions system at issue in Gratz
136. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Powell, J.)). We discussed this
hypothetical earlier. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
137. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted). Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist gave short
shrift to how the flagging system mitigated what seems like a disproportionate point distribution.
After all, if applicant C truly had artistic talent that rivaled Monet or Picasso, then as long as that
applicant met the requirements for being flagged for further review by the admissions review
committee, he would most certainly have been admitted by the review committee. To be flagged,
the student would need to have been academically qualified and earned a selection index score of at
least 75 if he was not a resident of Michigan and 80 if he was a resident of Michigan. See supra
note 94. The applicant would have been awarded 5 points for his personal achievement due to his
"extraordinary talent," and surely an applicant with this much talent would have earned the 20
points available at the provost's discretion. See supra note 92. So, this future Monet or Picasso
would have needed to cobble together only 50 or 55 more points to be flagged. Given the multitude
of other ways he could have earned points and the fact that many points were available for even a
low GPA, it seems that such a student would have been flagged as long as his credentials were not
unduly low, in which case it might be appropriate to reject him.
138. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(a) (discussing this measure).
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was not narrowly tailored, he implied that courts may want to make such a
comparison: "[w]e find that the University's policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely
because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program."'' 39  Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not pursue this inquiry further and so it is unclear to what ex-
tent such an inquiry is relevant not only to the individualized consideration
inquiry, but also, more broadly, to the narrow tailoring inquiry. To the extent
that such an inquiry is relevant, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist once again
did not offer a theory for determining when race receives too much weight
relative to the total number of points needed for admission.
140
In addition to suggesting that courts should look at the means of the
admissions system to determine if universities place too much weight on
race, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that courts might look at admissions
outcomes. He noted that "unlike Justice Powell's example, where the race of
a 'particular black applicant' could be considered without being decisive, the
LSA's automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making 'the factor
of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented
minority applicant.' 14' This statement's placement in a paragraph about indi-
vidualized consideration indicates that Chief Justice Rehnquist saw the
weight inquiry as part of the individualized consideration inquiry.
Furthermore, it suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist thought one way to
measure whether a university gives too much weight to race is to examine the
percentage of "minimally qualified. . . minority applicant[s]" for whom race
is "decisive. '' 142 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not, however, offer a theory for
determining when an admissions system assigns too much weight to race un-
der his proposed measure. 143
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Gratz sheds further light on what
the Gratz Court said about whether a weight inquiry is part of the
139. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Rehnquist's figure of one-fifth
comes from the fact that preferred minorities could earn 20 points for their race, see supra note 92,
and the majority opinion stated that an index of 100 points or more guaranteed admission, see supra
note 93.
140. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(b) (criticizing this measure).
141. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 317 (Powell, J.)).
142. Id. Two circuit court opinions have applied the Gratz outcome test as part of their narrow
tailoring analysis. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating, without
providing empirical support, that "unlike the program found unconstitutional in Gratz, the racial and
ethnic pluses here did not 'ha[ve] the effect of making the factor of race decisive for virtually every
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant"' (alteration in original) (quoting Gratz,
539 U.S. at 272)); Petit v. City ofChicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying a more
lenient version of the Gratz outcome test, stating that "[i]t cannot be said that the process affected
every 'minimally qualified' candidate as did the blanket award of 20 points per candidate, the
procedure found to be unconstitutional in Gratz").
143. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(c) (criticizing this measure).
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individualized consideration inquiry. 144 Justice Souter stated that the weight
component might have been the basis for the Court's decision to strike down
the College's program: "[t]he [Court's] objection goes to the use of points to
quantify and compare characteristics or ... the number of points awarded
due to race." 145 The placement of this sentence after a sentence referring to
individualized consideration suggests that Justice Souter read the Court to be
saying that the weight inquiry is part of the individualized consideration
inquiry.
146
So, the Gratz majority opinion suggests that a weight inquiry is part of
the individualized consideration inquiry, and it proposed three methods for
measuring weight: (1) comparing the number of points assigned to race to the
number of points assigned to other characteristics; (2) comparing the number
of points assigned to race to the number of points needed for admission; and
(3) comparing the number of qualified minority applicants for whom race
was decisive to the total number of qualified minority applicants. For none
of these measures, however, did Chief Justice Rehnquist explain why the
measure captures the constitutionally relevant weight assigned to race. In
addition, for none of the measures did he offer a theory for where the line
should be drawn between programs that place too much weight on race and
programs that do not. 147
b. The Grutter Measure of Excessiveness.-The majority opinion in
Grutter also suggested that the weight given to race is relevant to the
individualized consideration inquiry, but its discussion of weight was
different from Gratz's discussion of weight:
144. Justice Souter's dissent also addressed how he thinks weight should be measured:
[I]t [is not] possible to say that the 20 points convert race into a decisive factor
comparable to reserving minority places as in Bakke. Of course we can conceive of a
point system in which the "plus" factor given to minority applicants would be so
extreme as to guarantee every minority applicant a higher rank than every nonminority
applicant in the university's admissions system. But petitioners do not have a
convincing argument that the freshman admissions system operates this way.... It
suffices for me, as it did for the District Court, that there are no Bakke-like set-asides
and that consideration of an applicant's whole spectrum of ability is no more ruled out
by giving 20 points for race than by giving the same points for athletic ability or
socioeconomic disadvantage.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295-96 (Souter, J., dissenting). So, for Justice Souter, an admissions system
should not weigh race so heavily that either it effectively operates as a quota or all minority
applicants are ranked higher than all nonminority applicants. Note, however, that this latter test is
absurd-only the most extreme admissions programs would rank all preferred minority applicants
above all other applicants. This test does not offer a helpful benchmark for separating constitutional
systems from unconstitutional ones.
145. Id. at 295.
146. The previous sentence is as follows: "The Court nonetheless finds fault with a scheme that
automatically' distributes 20 points to minority applicants because 'the only consideration that
accompanies this distribution of points is a factual review of an application to determine whether an
individual is a member of one of these minority groups."' Id.
147. We discuss both of these shortcomings infra in section V(A)(2).
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When using race as a "plus" factor in university admissions, a
university's admissions program must remain flexible enough to
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a
way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application. The importance of this individualized
consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount.1
48
Justice O'Connor framed the weight requirement as prohibiting race or
ethnicity from becoming the "defining feature" of an application.' 49 Given
that Justice O'Connor sandwiched this statement about race not being the
"defining feature" between two statements about individualized
consideration, it seems reasonable to infer that she viewed the inquiry into
whether race is a "defining feature" as part of the individualized
consideration inquiry.' 50
But, what does it mean for race to be the "defining feature" of an
application? Justice O'Connor did not explain what she meant by "defining
feature," but later in the opinion, during the same discussion, she noted what
she saw as evidence that the Law School gave sufficient weight to factors
other than race:
The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with
grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority
applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are rejected.
This shows that the Law School seriously weighs many other
diversity factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive
difference for nonminority applicants as well.
151
The Grutter Court seemed to be suggesting a measure along the
outcome dimension. This outcome measure differs from the Gratz Court's
outcome measure, however. Rather than use the Gratz measure of examining
the percentage of qualified minority applicants for whom race is decisive,
Grutter advocated looking at admissions outcomes to determine how
148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Justice O'Connor's views on this matter are consistent with her views in the voting
redistricting cases-just as consideration of race is permissible (in that it passes strict scrutiny) in
the admissions context as long as race is not the "defining feature" of an application, consideration
of race is permissible (in that it does not trigger strict scrutiny) in the redistricting context as long as
race is not the "predominant factor" motivating a redistricting decision. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (O'Connor, J.) ("For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that
other, legitimate districting principles were 'subordinated' to race. By that, we mean that race must
be 'the predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."' (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995))); cf Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) ("Race must not simply have been 'a motivation for the
drawing of a majority-minority district,' but 'the "predominant factor" motivating the legislature's
districting decision."' (citation omitted) (quoting Vera, 517 U.S. at 959 (O'Connor, J.) and Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999))).
151. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).
2007]
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 557 2006-2007
Texas Law Review
"frequently"'52 cases arose in which race clearly did not trump nonracial
characteristics.
153
Further evidence that the Grutter Court viewed the weight inquiry to be
part of the individualized consideration inquiry comes in its discussion of the
requirement that the affirmative action plan not unduly burden third parties.
The Grutter Court noted that "in the context of its individualized inquiry into
the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-
conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants."' 54  The fact that the no-undue-burden requirement-a
requirement that is related to the weight given to race in admissions --is
necessarily satisfied by an admissions plan that provides individualized con-
sideration implies that the weight inquiry must be part of the individualized
consideration inquiry.
So, the Grutter Court also viewed the weight inquiry as part of the
individualized consideration inquiry, but it suggested a different-and
weaker-measure for determining whether race had been given too much
weight. It asked whether race was the defining feature of an application, and
it answered this question in the negative if nonminority applicants were
"frequently" admitted with lower credentials than minority applicants who
were rejected. As was the case in Gratz, the Court did not attempt to justify
why its measure captures the constitutionally relevant weight assigned to
race. And, also like the Gratz Court, the Grutter Court failed to offer a the-
ory for where the line should be drawn between programs that weight race
too heavily and those that do not.1
56
Two important points have emerged in this section. First, the Court
viewed the inquiry into the weight assigned to race as part of the individual-
ized consideration inquiry, but it analyzed the weight the programs assigned
to race differently in Grutter and Gratz. Second, the Court did not adopt a
minimum necessary preference approach to determining whether race was
given too much weight. Instead, the Court made assertions about whether
the weight given to race was too much without explaining how it determined
what "too much" was.
152. For a description and discussion of what the Court means by the word "frequently," see
infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
153. One circuit court has applied a more lenient version of the Grutter outcome test. See
Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating, without empirical support, that
"[the Law School also accepted nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than
underrepresented minority applicants who were rejected, thus showing that the Law School
Iseriously weigh[ed] many other diversity factors besides race that [could] make a real and
dispositive difference' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338)). See infra note 204 for a discussion of
Smith's use of this measure.
154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
155. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
156. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(d) (criticizing this measure).
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C. How the Three Meanings Fit Together
Read together, Grutter and Gratz suggest that the Court has adopted a
"Don't Tell, Don't Ask" approach to individualized consideration: if
universities don't tell how much weight they give to race by quantifying
racial preferences, then courts won't ask probing questions about whether the
preferences are differentiated and not excessive. If, however, universities do
tell, then courts will conduct a searching review of the admissions program,
examining whether preferences are in fact differentiated and not excessive.
157
When it came to looking at differentiation, the Court simply accepted
the Law School's assertions that its racial preferences varied within
particular minority groups depending on various non-race attributes. The
Court did not seek to determine whether the preferences were differentiated
in fact but instead was satisfied with a showing of potential differentiation.
In contrast, the Court attacked the College's program for not being suffi-
ciently differentiated because the College assigned all minority applicants the
same number of points for their race. 158 But, at the end of the day, the Court
had no basis for concluding that the Law School's system was in fact more
differentiated than the College's system.
And, when it came to examining excessiveness, the Court applied
different tests to measure the weight given to race at the Law School and at
the College. When examining the weight assigned to race at the Law School,
the Court applied one test that attempted to capture weight along the outcome
dimension. In contrast, when examining the weight assigned to race at the
College, the Court applied two tests that attempted to capture weight along
the means dimension and one test that attempted to capture weight along the
outcome dimension. The two outcome tests the Court applied were certainly
different in form-the Grutter test examined how frequently nonpreferred
applicants were admitted with lower GPAs and test scores than preferred
157. Cf Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side ofGrutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 247 (2004)
("The real difference between the law school program upheld in Grutter and the undergraduate
program invalidated in Gratz seems to be that the Supreme Court believes that the Gratz program
gave too much weight to the factor of race, and it did so in a manner that was too transparent."); cf
also PETER H. SCHUCK, MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODERATE 12-18 (2006) (arguing that the
strict scrutiny applied by the Grutter Court was anything but strict); Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist
Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 249, 281 (2004) ("'Strict scrutiny'
now means virtually no scrutiny, at least as to university admissions policies that discriminate
against certain races, such as whites and Asians. To put the point another way, Grutter creates a
safe harbor for such discrimination that extends over the whole ocean, except for one little cove that
contains strictly unbending quotas and absolutely mechanical preferences like those at issue in
Bakke and Gratz."). Another way of conceptualizing the "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" position of the
Court is that not only should universities not "tell" by quantifying their admissions programs, but
also universities should not "tell" by placing so much weight on race that the university effectively
"tells" the Court something about the weight it places on race.
158. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court in Grutter for
"tak[ing] the Law School at its word that its admissions program is nuanced" without a showing of
actual differentiation while striking down the College's program in Gratz because of its
"mechanical nature").
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minority applicants who were rejected, while the Gratz test examined the
percentage of qualified minority applicants for whom race was decisive. But,
could it be the case that although these two tests were formally different, they
were functionally equivalent? If that were so, we would expect that the Law
School would fare better than the College on both tests. Instead, however,
we will demonstrate in the remainder of this subpart that the Law School ac-
tually fares worse than the College on the Gratz test, demonstrating that the
differences in the Court's outcome tests are differences of substance and that
the Court was applying different standards to the two admissions
programs. 159
The Gratz outcome measure asks whether an admissions program "has
the effect of making 'the factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant., 160  The Gratz
Court did not make clear what it meant by "qualified," and the source it cited
for support of the proposition that virtually all qualified minority applicants
were accepted did not provide a definition either, 16 1 so we must approximate
a definition. We first aggregated all of the relevant data across residency
status, race, and year 62 so that we could work with grids that had test score
ranges on one dimension and GPA ranges on the other dimension. We then
defined an applicant to be "qualified" if either (1) the applicant was in a cell
in which greater than or equal to five percent of the applicants in that cell
were admitted and greater than or equal to three applicants were admitted, or
(2) the applicant was in a cell whose test score range and GPA range were
greater than or equal to a cell meeting the description in (1).163
159. We do not conduct similar analysis on the Grutter test because the test itself is not well
defined. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. While we do not fully analyze how the
College data fare under the Grutter test, we do report on some calculations that have some bearing
on this question. See infra note 205.
160. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003) (omission in original) (quoting Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
161. The Court cited the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari. Id. at 254 (citing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari app. at 11 la, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516)).
162. When computing statistics for the College for 1999, we did not aggregate across years; we
examined only the 1999 data. Also, when performing these computations for the College data, we
were not able to aggregate all five years of data because the test score ranges used in the 1995 data
were different from the ranges used in the 1996-1999 data. Because we were already separately
performing computations for the 1999 data, we created separate grids for the 1995 data, the 1996-
1998 data, and the 1999 data. After coming up with a different definition for "qualified" for each
grid, we computed the relevant numbers for each grid and then aggregated those numbers to come
up with the figures for the "College: all years" row of Table 5.
163. The Court stated that all applicants who were accepted were "qualified." See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003) (noting that "all underrepresented minority students admitted
by the Law School have been deemed qualified"); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Every applicant admitted under the current plan, petitioners do not here dispute, is qualified to
attend the College." (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 11 la, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-
516))); Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at lIla, Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) ("According
to the University, all of the students admitted to the [College] are qualified to attend the University,
and for purpose of these motions, Plaintiffs assume this proposition to be true."). While all admits
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We then computed the number at issue in the Gratz test, the percentage
of qualified preferred minority applicants for whom race was decisive, by
dividing the number of qualified but-for admits by the number of qualified
preferred minority applicants. 164 Our results are summarized in Table 5.65
were qualified, it does not follow that all applicants with the same academic credentials as all
admits were qualified. Indeed, it is likely that some of the admits with low qualifications were
deemed qualified because of factors beyond their GPAs and test scores, such as strong letters of
recommendation. We therefore did not want to count as qualified every applicant sharing a cell
with an admit. We tried to strike a balance by deeming an applicant qualified if and only if greater
than or equal to three applicants in her cell were admitted, and they made up greater than or equal to
five percent of all applicants in that cell. This measure is, of course, to some degree arbitrary in that
we could have chosen other figures besides the three admit and five-percent figures. Nonetheless,
this measure seems to be a good attempt at approximating a definition of "qualified."
164. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for a description of how we computed the
number of but-for admits. Note that when computing the number of but-for admits, our data were
broken down by year, residency status, test score range, and GPA range. We also computed the
percentage of qualified preferred minority applicants who were accepted and, for comparative
purposes, the percentage of nonpreferred qualified applicants who were accepted:
Percentage of qualified Percentage of qualified
preferred minority applicants nonpreferred applicants
accepted accepted
Law School: all years 63% 38%
College: all years 90% 69%
College: 1999 87% 71%
Thus, while the proportion of minimally qualified preferred minority applicants who were admitted
was larger at the College, the proportion of minimally qualified preferred minority applicants who
were admitted because of their race was larger at the Law School.
165. Our results were robust. To check the robustness, we used two closely related methods for
approximating a definition for qualified.
For the first alternative method, we defined an applicant to be "qualified" if the school admitted
at least one person with the same characteristics as the applicant (ignoring race)-that is, the same
GPA range, test score range, residency status, and year of application. This method differs from the
method used in the text in several ways. First, we do not aggregate data (except race) before
determining whether particular cells contain applicants who are qualified. Second, as long as any
applicant with a given combination of characteristics (ignoring race) is admitted, all applicants with
that same combination of characteristics are deemed "qualified," even if only a small number or
percentage of such applicants are accepted. Third, this method does not deem qualified those
applicants in cells where there are no admits, even if those cells have test score ranges and GPA
ranges that are greater than or equal to other cells whose applicants have been deemed "qualified."
Significantly, the results from this method are almost identical to the results we obtain when using
the method described in the text:
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Table 5
Percentage of qualified preferred minority applicants for whom
race was decisive
Law School: all years 52%
College: all years 48%
College: 1999 32%
Alternative method 1: Defining qualified by determining if another applicant with the same combination
of characteristics (of any race) was admitted
Percentage of
qualified preferred Percentage of
minority applicants for qualified preferred Percentage of
whom race was minority applicants qualified nonpreferred
decisive accepted applicants accepted
Law School: all years 53% 64% 39%
College: all years 48% 90% 70%
College: 1999 32% 88% 72%
For the second alternative method, we performed the same computations described in the text,
except the grids we used to determine which cells contained "qualified" applicants contained
admissions data for nonpreferred applicants only. That is, we said that an applicant was "qualified"
if (1) the applicant was in a cell such that greater than or equal to five percent of nonpreferred
applicants in that cell were admitted and greater than or equal to three nonpreferred applicants were
admitted, or (2) the applicant was in a cell whose test score range and GPA range are greater than or
equal to a cell meeting the description in (1). Once we identified the cells that contained "qualified"
applicants, our analysis was the same as the analysis described in the text. When we used this
method, we obtained the following results:
Alternative method 2: Defining qualified with reference to nonpreferred applicants
Percentage of
qualified preferred Percentage of
minority applicants for qualified preferred Percentage of
whom race was minority applicants qualified nonpreferred
decisive accepted applicants accepted
Law School: all years 60% 89% 50%
College: all years 46% 95% 70%
College: 1999 32% 88% 71%
This method yields results that are similar to those obtained with our other two methods. In all
three methods, the percentage of qualified minority applicants for whom race was decisive was
larger at the Law School. In addition, in all three methods, it is not true that race was decisive for
"virtually every" qualified minority applicant at the College-rather, race was decisive for under
half of the qualified minority applicants.
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 562 2006-2007
Don't Tell, Don't Ask
Our computations demonstrate two important points. First, under the
Gratz measure of weight, the Law School actually assigned more weight to
race than the College. Race was decisive for 52% of the qualified minority
applicants at the Law School, whereas it was decisive for only 48% of the
qualified minority applicants at the College for all years, and 32% of the
qualified minority applicants for 1999, the year the program at issue in Gratz
was in place.
Second, stunningly, the Court misapplied its own test in Gratz-the
Court was incorrect in concluding that race was decisive for "virtually every
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant" at the College. In
fact, race was decisive for only 48% of all qualified minority applicants at
the College for all years and for only 32% of qualified minority applicants
for 1999, the year that the College used the program at issue in Gratz.
But how could the Court have made this error? The fact that the
College admitted virtually every qualified minority applicant was a fact that
was not contested in Gratz, a point that Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his
opinion.166  Because Chief Justice Rehnquist cited no authority for the
proposition that race was decisive for virtually every qualified minority
applicant, it seems reasonable to assume that he thought that the latter
proposition-that race was decisive for virtually all qualified minority
applicants-followed from the former proposition-that virtually all quali-
fied minority applicants were admitted. 67 A large proportion of minimally
166. Early in the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "it is undisputed that the
University admits 'virtually every qualified... applicant' from these groups [underrepresented
minorities]." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254 (omission in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 163, app. at I lla). His statement that this fact was "undisputed" seems accurate-the
brief for the University of Michigan stated that "LS&A ends up admitting virtually all minority
applicants with competitive academic credentials." Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at
4-5. And, our calculations indicate that 90% of the qualified minority applicants were admitted for
the years 1995-1999, and 87% were admitted in 1999; both figures are close to "virtually every"
qualified applicant.
167. Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist meant to say that the College's admissions program was
defective not because race was decisive for virtually every qualified minority applicant, but rather
because virtually every qualified minority applicant was admitted. If this was the test that he meant
to apply, then the College would have done worse under this measure than the Law School because
the College admitted 90% of all qualified minority applicants in all years and 87% in 1999, while
the Law School admitted only 63% of all qualified minority applicants. But, this cannot be a
sensible metric because it penalizes less selective institutions like the College, which admit a higher
percentage of all applicants. If an institution admits around 70% of all qualified applicants and
gives a nontrivial boost for race, then it follows that "virtually every" qualified minority applicant
will be admitted. In contrast, if an institution admits fewer applicants, such as, for example, 40% of
applicants, and grants a boost of a similar size, the boost will not result in admitting "virtually
every" qualified minority applicant. In addition, if the applicant pool of minority applicants who
fall into the "qualified" category happens to be especially strong, then "virtually every" minority
applicant may be admitted even in the absence of any preference for race. Justice Souter made this
point in his dissent in Gratz. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the
university admits virtually every qualified under-represented minority applicant, may reflect
nothing more than ... the possibility that self-selection results in a strong minority applicant pool."
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qualified minorities was admitted to the undergraduate program, but for a
large chunk of these minorities, race was not decisive. Thus, the latter
proposition does not follow from the former position, and so if this was Chief
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, he was mistaken.
These data demonstrate that the tests applied to the admissions
programs at the Law School and the College were substantively different.
That the Law School fares worse than the College on the Gratz test shows
that the Court analyzed the two systems differently, supporting our "Don't
Tell, Don't Ask" interpretation of the cases.
1 68
Part IV has argued that the Grutter and Gratz Courts essentially adopted
a "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" approach to narrow tailoring.1 69  If a university
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
163, app. at l Ila)).
168. Peter Schuck has observed that the Grutter Court approved of the Law School's
affirmative action program only because "[t]he program is sufficiently opaque by design and allows
enough scope for subjectivity and discretion in the arbitrary and undisclosed weighting of the 'soft
variables' in individual cases that a skeptic cannot prove unmistakably that race-ethnicity is the
predominant factor in the admission of preferred minorities." SCHUCK, supra note 157, at 16. We
agree that Grutter applied a lower level of scrutiny to the Law School program because of its
opacity. We disagree, however, that the Court was not capable of determining the weight assigned
to race in the Law School program. Indeed, Part III demonstrated one method the Court could have
used to determine the weight the Law School assigned to race.
169. Circuit courts have varied in the degree to which they have adhered to what we argue is
Grutter and Gratz's "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" approach. Only one circuit court has reached the
question whether an admissions program in the higher education context was narrowly tailored to
the diversity interest. Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004). That court faithfully
adhered to Grutter and Gratz's "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" approach, subjecting a law school
admissions program that did not "tell" to little scrutiny. See id. at 375-82 (holding that the
admissions program was narrowly tailored to the diversity interest).
Several circuit courts have reached the question whether affirmative action programs in contexts
other than higher education admissions are narrowly tailored to particular interests. Two circuit
courts have avoided the "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" individualized consideration regime by expressly
limiting the circumstances in which Grutter and Gratz require individualized consideration, holding
that the individualized consideration requirement does not apply to K-12 non-merit-based school-
choice plans. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1180-
84 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
418 F.3d 1, 17-19 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005); cf McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming district court
opinion upholding a race-based school-choice plan but not conducting any independent analysis of
the constitutionality of the plan), cert. granted sub noma. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Feb.
2007) (manuscript at 24-26, on file with authors) (arguing that the individualized consideration
requirement of Grutter and Gratz should not apply to K-12 school-choice plans not based on
merit); James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 327,
341-42 (2006) (same). The Supreme Court will soon decide the extent to which Grutter and Gratz
apply to race-based K-12 school-choice plans when it decides Parents Involved and Meredith.
Three circuit courts have implicitly limited the circumstances in which Grutter and Gratz
require individualized consideration by upholding affirmative action programs without considering
whether the programs provided individualized consideration. See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash.
State Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century, which authorizes the use of race- and sex-based preferences in federally
funded transportation contracts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006); Petit v. City of Chicago, 352
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does not tell how much of a preference it grants racial minorities, then the
Court is not searching in its review of whether the preferences are differenti-
ated or excessive. Indeed, if the university does not tell, as was the case in
Grutter, the Court is satisfied with potential differentiation, and it hardly in-
quires into whether the weight assigned to race is excessive. In contrast, if a
university does tell how much of a preference it grants racial minorities by
quantifying racial preferences, then the Court subjects the program to intense
scrutiny as to whether the preferences are differentiated and excessive. Part
V will argue that this narrow tailoring analysis has two significant flaws and
will articulate a vision of what narrow tailoring analysis should look like in
the admissions context.
V. A Normative Critique of Grutter and Gratz
The Grutter and Gratz narrow tailoring analysis described in Part IV
departs from the pre-Grutter and Gratz narrow tailoring analysis in two
significant ways. First, post-Grutter and Gratz, the scrutiny of admissions
programs that quantify racial preferences is stricter than the scrutiny of ad-
missions programs that do not quantify racial preferences. Second, post-
Grutter and Gratz, the weight inquiry is not a minimum necessary preference
inquiry, but rather is divorced from any kind of theory about what amount of
weight is permissible. This Part will begin in subpart A by arguing that both
shifts are mistakes and then will outline in subpart B how the Court should
conduct its narrow tailoring inquiry when evaluating admissions programs.
A. Two Mistaken Shifts
Section 1 will argue that Grutter and Gratz were mistaken to the extent
that they transformed narrow tailoring analysis so that quantified admissions
programs receive more intense scrutiny than unquantified ones. Section 2
will then argue that the Court was also mistaken in its treatment of the weight
inquiry; instead of determining whether programs granted the minimum nec-
essary preference, the Court assessed whether race was assigned too much
weight without any coherent theory about how to measure weight and how to
determine whether a given preference is excessive.
1. Quantification Inquiry Mistake.-Part IV established that admissions
programs that do not "tell" through quantification are practically exempt
from narrow tailoring scrutiny, whereas programs that do tell are subject to
stricter scrutiny. This section argues that the narrow tailoring inquiry should
not be stricter when applied to programs that quantify. The idea that
F.3d 1111, 1114-18 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding an affirmative action program used to promote
police officers); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969-74 (8th Cir.
2003) (upholding the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century). Nonetheless, Petit did
address one of the weight requirements in Gratz. See supra note 142.
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quantification should trigger heightened scrutiny is not supported by
precedent, 170 and it does not bear any relationship to the diversity rationale
articulated by Justice O'Connor in Grutter.'71  Indeed, in no way does
whether universities assign race a number have any effect on being able to
enroll a student body that can enjoy the benefits of diversity: stimulating
classroom discussions, the breaking down of racial stereotypes, and the
opening up of universities to people of all races.17
2
And, while it may be true that the diversity interest requires that an
admissions process be sufficiently nuanced so as to take into account the
many diversity offerings applicants have, 173 there is no reason that a
sophisticated point system would not be up to this challenge. A well-
designed point system could incorporate any number of variables, including
170. The Gratz opinion never directly cited precedent to argue against quantification, but there
is one place in which the Gratz Court cited precedent in what may have been an effort to argue
against quantification. Chief Justice Rehnquist followed the statement that "[t]he admissions
program Justice Powell described... did not contemplate that any single characteristic
automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university's diversity," Gratz, 539
U.S. at 271, with citations to two cases, Bakke and Metro Broadcasting. To the extent that the
Gratz Court meant for this statement to assert an anti-quantification position, the cases cited to
support that position fail to do so. The page of Bakke that Gratz cited made two points. First, it
stated that the diversity interest that supports an affirmative action program is not an interest in
racial diversity alone, but rather "encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element." Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J.). Second, it noted that the
state's diversity interest would not be served "by expanding petitioner's two-track system into a
multitrack program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each identifiable category of
applicants." Id. Thus, Justice Powell did not imply that in a plus-factor plan race cannot be
assigned a "specific and identifiable" weight. The part of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in
Metro Broadcasting that Gratz cited stated that policies that "presume that persons think in a
manner associated with their race" are constitutionally impermissible. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 618 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unquantified systems that take account of
race in making admissions decisions, however, make assumptions about applicants that are based on
race just as much as quantified systems. So, while this critique may provide a basis for arguing
against racial preferences, it does not provide a basis for distinguishing between quantified and
unquantified systems. Furthermore, a system that uses race to make admissions decisions-whether
it is quantified or not--does not necessarily embody the notion that "persons think in a manner
associated with their race." Rather, a race-conscious admissions system can embody the notion that
in our society, race often affects people's experiences, which in turn shape how people think.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having
particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own,
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately
still matters."). Therefore, the only citations to precedent that may have been intended to support a
no quantification requirement fail to support the position.
171. See Spann, supra note 157, at 243-44 (noting that "for any individual applicant, race is
either dispositive or it is not," that this "is true whether race is used holistically in connection with a
flexible admissions process, or mechanically in connection with a mathematical score" and that
"[t]herefore, the differences that exist between the ways in which race was used in Grutter and in
Gratz are simply irrelevant to any constitutionally protected individual right").
172. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (describing the diversity interest).
173. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J.) (stating that the diversity interest "encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element").
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subjective variables, and could use formulas that assign race different
weights depending on an applicant's other characteristics, thus ensuring that
all characteristics are meaningfully considered in a nuanced fashion. Indeed,
any admissions process that is not random will admit applicants according to
a pattern that can be modeled by a formula of some sort, even if the formula
is complicated. As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Gratz, it is
difficult to see why a university should be prohibited from using a formula
that is equivalent to the nonformulaic consideration it would otherwise
provide.
1 74
The diversity interest does not call for a requirement of unquantified
admissions systems, and should not, as such a requirement is bad policy. A
''no quantification requirement" will cause universities to adopt admissions
plans that are, on average, less transparent.1 75 Justices Souter and Ginsburg
noted the importance of transparency in their dissents in Gratz. When com-
paring the program at issue in Gratz to "race-neutral" percent plans, Justice
Souter noted that he preferred plans like the one at issue in Gratz because
"[e]qual protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the
ones who hide the ball." 176 Justice Ginsburg agreed, noting that "[i]f honesty
is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed
College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar num-
bers through winks, nods, and disguises."
177
Ironically, even Justice O'Connor, whose Grutter opinion upheld the
Law School's decidedly untransparent admissions program, recognized the
importance of transparency in her Gratz concurrence. In rejecting arguments
that the review provided by the committee that considered flagged
applications was sufficient to satisfy the individualized consideration
174. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Since college admission is not left entirely
to inarticulate intuition, it is hard to see what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a
relevant characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing style, running speed, or minority
race. Justice Powell's plus factors necessarily are assigned some values. The college simply does
by a numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its 'holistic review'; the distinction does
not imply that applicants to the undergraduate college are denied individualized consideration or a
fair chance to compete on the basis of all the various merits their applications may disclose."
(citation omitted)). Robert George makes a similar point when he states that the "question that the
remaining Justices, particularly Justice O'Connor, fail to address adequately is: How can it be
unconstitutional to do honestly and above board what it is constitutionally permissible to do
'through winks, nods, and disguises'?" George, supra note 109, at 1634-35 (quoting Gratz, 539
U.S. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
175. Several scholars have noted that after Grutter and Gratz, courts sanction admissions
systems that are lacking in transparency. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 135, at 194-95 ("[T]he
likely immediate consequence of Grutter is that trusted admissions officials are now freer to make
their decisions without a great deal of transparency."); Post, supra note 20, at 74 ("Although
transparency is ordinarily prized in the law, the Court in Grutter and Gratz constructs doctrine that
in effect demands obscurity."); Sunstein, supra note 109, at 1905-07 (discussing the lack of
transparency in systems not using points).
176. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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requirement, Justice O'Connor noted disapprovingly that "there is no
evidence of how the decisions are actually made-what type of
individualized consideration is or is not used.",1 78 Of course, the same criti-
cism could be leveled against the admissions program of the Law School,
and how-or whether-Justice O'Connor can distinguish between the two is
unclear. 179
The lack of transparency is problematic for several reasons.180 First, it
is antidemocratic-it prevents citizens from obtaining the information
needed to judge the policy of public institutions. 81 Second, the lack of trans-
parency invites more arbitrary admissions decisions. 18 Under an
178. Id. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concluded that the review
provided by the committee did not satisfy the requirement of individualized consideration, citing
several grounds in addition to the one described in the text. See id. (noting two further problems
with the committee's review of applications: (1) it was not clear that the committee reviewed a
"meaningful percentage" of applications, and (2) qualification for review by the committee was still
based in part on the selection index score).
179. In Grutter, the Court cited Law School policies that assert that each application is assessed
in a manner that provides individualized consideration. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
337-39 (2003); see also supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. But, the Grutter Court did not
examine any evidence about whether decisions were actually made in accordance with these
policies, except to examine some statistics suggesting that race was not always dispositive. See
supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. So, citation to policies asserting there was individual
review was sufficient for the Grutter Court to support the proposition that the system provided
individualized review. Yet, in Gratz, Justice O'Connor was not satisfied that the admissions review
committee provided individualized review, despite the fact that according to the brief for the
University of Michigan, this review was perhaps just as individualized: "every member of the
[admissions review committee] closely reviews each applicant's entire file; the whole committee
discusses the applicant's strengths and weaknesses." Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49,
at 9.
180. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Response to the Symposium Participants, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
75, 81 (2005) (arguing that affirmative action programs should be transparent because
"transparency... is designed to discipline the granting of preferences by forcing institutions to be
more candid about their value choices and by triggering reputational, market, and other informal
mechanisms that make the entity bear more of the costs of adopting preferences instead of shifting
them to innocent third parties" and noting that "[c]ustomers, students, alumni, investors, journalists,
and other interests to which the entity must be attentive can then hold it accountable, rewarding,
punishing, or ignoring the preferences, as they see fit" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 196-97
(2003))).
181. See Richard Kahlenberg, The Conservative Victory in Grutter and Gratz, JURIST LEGAL
INTELLIGENCE F., Sept. 5, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/kahlenberg.php
(characterizing the Grutter system as antidemocratic because it permits public universities to make
preferential admissions decisions without having to disclose their policies to the public); see also
David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the
Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized
Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 528 (2004) (noting that "the system struck down in Gratz has the
advantage of making the level of the preference visible, so that it can be analyzed, critiqued, and
reconsidered"); Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 458-459 (1987) (observing that
programs not "openly adopted and administered" do not "benefit[] from the scrutiny and testing of
means to ends assured by public deliberation").
182. Cass Sunstein has elaborated:
[I]t is unlikely that any particular officer [making admissions decisions under an
unquantified program like the one at issue in Grutter] will be able to give constant,
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unquantified regime, no concrete framework expresses the ways admissions
officers should weight competing characteristics, so individual admissions
officers will make admissions decisions that are relatively more
inconsistent. 83 In addition, schools using a quantified system likely require
fewer admissions officers to read applications, and the fewer people
involved, the more consistent decisions are likely to be. Third, unquantified
systems might invite not just arbitrariness, but also more opportunities to
make admissions decisions on invidious grounds. 184 Lani Guinier argues that
that obfuscation of admissions criteria can lead to "elite self-replication" 
185
because "to the extent that colleges and universities obscure their admissions
criteria, the elite are free to choose applicants like themselves and then le-
gitimate those choices with a critical mass of people of color."'
' 86
Some have suggested that the Court may view the very act of assigning
race a number to be problematic because of the expressive harm that comes
with assigning a number to race. 187 Under this view, the act of quantifying
rather than fluctuating, weight to race. It is even less likely that different officers will
use the same system, in the sense that they will allocate the same informal points, or
weight, to race. The resulting criteria will likely be highly variable across applicants,
and they will not be transparent to anyone. It follows that as compared to [a quantified
program], [an unquantified program] sacrifices three important values: predictability,
transparency, and equal treatment.
Sunstein, supra note 109, at 1905; see also Leonard M. Baynes, Michigan's Minority Point System
"Compensated" Minority Students for Inferior Public Education, JURIST LEGAL INTELLIGENCE F.,
Sept. 5, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/baynes.php (observing that "[rielying
solely on individualized determinations to implement affirmative action programs can cause" results
that are "arbitrary" because an "individualized determination is a standardless process").
183. Indeed, the University of Michigan explained that one of the purposes of the point system
was to make decisions consistent and fair:
The volume of applications requires procedures and routines to promote fairness and
consistency, while preserving counselors' ability to exercise judgment. A single,
unitary set of guidelines, which is reviewed annually and altered periodically, governs
the admissions process. The aim of the guidelines is to "blend the consistency of a
formula with the flexibility of a review that is ultimately a matter of human judgment."
Brief for Respondents, Gratz, supra note 49, at 6 (citation and footnotes omitted). And, university
admissions officers have reported that quantifying characteristics helps produce more consistent
results. See Guinier, supra note 135, at 195 n.318.
184. See Crump, supra note 181, at 528; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work:
A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1420 (2006)
("Grutter's conception of narrow tailoring depends on the same unchecked subjective
decisionmaking that, according to Title VII doctrine, invites bias.").
185. Guinier, supra note 135, at 196.
186. Id. at 196 n.320.
187. For example, Robert Post states that the Gratz Court may be prohibiting point systems
because "the twenty-point bonus sends a message to applicants and to the world that being a
member of a racial group is worth a certain, named amount, and it therefore invites members of that
group to feel entitled to that amount." Post, supra note 20, at 74; see also Sunstein, supra note 109,
at 1906 (describing the argument that unquantified systems impose a lesser expressive harm than
quantified systems). See generally Primus, supra note 101, at 566-67 (describing literature
discussing expressive harm).
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may itself be socially divisive. 188 If this is the rationale of the Court, it is not
persuasive. After all, the only theory under which an unquantified program
produces less social divisiveness than a quantified program is the theory that
the citizenry is less likely to learn about the university's racial preferences
under an unquantified system. 189 This theory is not justifiable because it also
limits courts' ability to make a judgment on the merits-without some kind
of ex ante quantification of costs and benefits, it is more difficult for courts to
assess whether racial preferences are excessive.'
90
This section has argued that narrow tailoring doctrine should not subject
admissions programs that quantify to stricter scrutiny than admissions
programs that do not quantify. Imposing stricter scrutiny on quantified
admissions programs is neither supported by precedent nor theoretically
defensible. Rather, narrow tailoring doctrine should subject both types of
programs to the usual narrow tailoring requirements, including the minimum
necessary preference and differentiation requirements.
2. Excessiveness Inquiry Mistake.-The Grutter and Gratz Courts also
introduced another problematic change into the narrow tailoring inquiry: to
the extent that the Grutter and Gratz Courts focused on weight through the
use of the four tests described in section IV(B)(3), the weight inquiry was not
an inquiry into whether racial preferences were the minimum necessary.
Indeed, to engage in a minimum necessary inquiry, the Court would have
needed to engage in a two-stage inquiry, first quantifying the constitutionally
relevant costs and benefits and then determining whether the benefits out-
weighed the costs, both overall and at the margin.1 91
The Court completely failed at the second stage in its treatment of all
four measures of weight because for all four measures, the Court lacked an
underlying theory for determining whether a given weight was excessive.
Instead, the Court merely asserted that the amount of weight given to race as
measured by each of the four tests was too much at the College and not too
188. Cf Ayres, supra note 21, at 1793-800 (describing-and refuting-arguments that race-
neutral means are less socially divisive than race-conscious means).
189. Cf id. at 1793-96 (criticizing the argument that race-neutral means are less socially
divisive than race-conscious means because the citizenry is less likely to be aware of the racial
motivation of the former); cf also Sunstein, supra note 109, at 1906 (persuasively refuting the
argument that quantified affirmative programs impose a stigma on minorities while unquantified
programs do not).
190. Cf Ayres, supra note 21, at 1795-96 (noting that the doctrine requiring consideration of
race-neutral alternatives may force legislatures to be less open about their use of race, shielding not
only the citizenry, but also the courts from information about when legislatures are acting on the
basis of race). Of course, if the Court prohibits only ex ante quantification (e.g., points systems) but
not ex post quantification (e.g., regressions that capture the weight assigned to race), then we need
not worry that the Court is being shielded from information about the amount of racial preferences.
We do, however, still need to be worried that the citizenry does not have access to this information.
191. See infra subpart V(B).
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much at the Law School, without explaining how that determination was-
and should be-made.
At the first stage, moreover, the Court made only limited progress
towards success. As the next four subsections will demonstrate, only one of
the Court's four tests for quantifying the costs of affirmative action measured
a constitutionally relevant cost. 192 This test was not sufficient, however, be-
cause it measured the burden of affirmative action along only the means
dimension. Furthermore, the Court made no attempt at quantifying the bene-
fits of affirmative action. The Court, therefore, also failed at the first stage of
quantifying the constitutionally relevant costs and benefits.
a. Gratz's First Means Measure.-Gratz suggested that a point
system that assigns too many points to race relative to the number of points
assigned to other characteristics may not satisfy the individualized
consideration requirement.1 93 We agree with the Court that this measure
captures part of the burden felt by nonpreferred applicants along the means
dimension. Indeed, this measure is similar to our GPA enhancement
measure-it attempts to determine the amount of boost applicants receive on
account of their race by comparing that amount to the amount of boost they
receive on account of other characteristics.
While we support the Court's use of this measure, this measure alone is
not enough because it captures cost along only the means dimension and not
also along the outcome dimension. In addition, the Court's use of this
measure was flawed because it was not rooted in a theory for determining
when the weight assigned to race is excessive. Instead, the Court should
have used this measure (or another measure of the means dimension) along
with a measure of costs along the outcome dimension and a measure of the
benefits to determine whether the benefits outweighed the costs in both an
overall and a marginal sense.
b. Gratz's Second Means Measure.-Gratz also suggested that a
point system that assigns too many points to race relative to the total number
of points needed for admission may not satisfy the individualized
consideration requirement.1 94 Unlike the first means measure, this measure
does not capture the burden of affirmative action programs. Indeed, this
measure is meaningless because universities can manipulate point systems so
that functionally equivalent admissions systems have different ratios of
192. The test that measured a constitutionally relevant burden was Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Gratz test, which compared the number of points assigned to race to the number of points assigned
to other characteristics. See infra subsection V(A)(2)(a) (arguing that while Rehnquist's test in
Gratz captures the means dimension, it is inadequate because it does not measure outcomes and
fails to suggest a theory that determines how much weight assigned to race is excessive).
193. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273 (2003); see also supra subsection IV(B)(3)(a).
194. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; see also supra subsection IV(B)(3)(a).
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points assigned to race to points needed to earn admission. For example,
imagine that the College changed its admissions system such that instead of
being able to earn up to 150 points, applicants could earn up to 1,050 points,
and instead of needing a score of 100 points to earn admission to the College,
applicants needed a score of 1,000 points to earn admission. 195 Suppose that
applicants earn 900 points simply for completing the application, and they
earn the other 150 points in the same way they earn points under the system
at issue in Gratz. Such a system would be functionally equivalent to the
system at issue in Gratz. Unlike the system at issue in Gratz, however,
where race accounted for 20/100, or 20%, of the points needed for admission,
under the hypothetical system, race would account for only 20/1000, or 2%,
of the points needed for admission. This example demonstrates that the ratio
of the points assigned to race to the points needed to earn admission does not
provide a measure of the weight universities assign to race and is therefore
inadequate.
c. Gratz's Outcome Measure.-Gratz argued that at least part of the
reason the College's admissions program was not narrowly tailored was that
it "ha[d] the effect of making 'the factor of race. . . decisive' for virtually
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant."'19 6 Subpart
IV(C) argued that the Court actually misapplied its own test in Gratz. This
subsection puts that issue aside and argues that the test itself is not a good
measure of whether an admissions program places too much weight on race.
First, an aside is in order on this test's lack of basis in precedent. While
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Justice Powell's Bakke opinion for support for
this measure, Chief Justice Rehnquist misread Justice Powell's opinion. The
portion of Justice Powell's opinion that Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted is as
follows:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being
decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. 197
When Justice Powell said race should not necessarily be "decisive" for a
"particular black applicant," he meant that a minority applicant should not be
admitted ahead of a nonminority applicant who can, notwithstanding his
race, contribute more to the diversity of the school. 198 Note that when Justice
195. For a description of the point values assigned to characteristics under the system at issue in
Gratz, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
196. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (omission in original) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
197. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.).
198. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Powell talked about race not being "decisive" for a given candidate, he talked
about it in relative terms, as demonstrated by the fact that he followed the
word "decisive" with the words "when compared ... with."
In contrast, when Chief Justice Rehnquist cited this passage of Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion, he took the words out of context, stripping them of
their relativistic meaning. For Justice Powell, the fact that race was decisive
for "virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant '' 99 would be troubling only if by admitting those candidates, other
nonminority candidates were rejected who would have been better able to
contribute to the diversity of the campus notwithstanding their race. So, as
far as the precedent of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is concerned, it is
irrelevant what fraction of qualified minority applicants at universities are
but-for admits; what is relevant is the relative diversity offerings of those
minority applicants accepted and those nonminority applicants rejected.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's standard is therefore not rooted in precedent,
as he suggested. Moreover, this standard for measuring the weight given to
race does not capture the constitutionally relevant costs of affirmative action.
Examining the percentage of qualified minority applicants for whom race is
decisive cannot help determine the extent to which an affirmative action pro-
gram imposes costs on nonpreferred racial groups because it does not
examine the impact of such a program on nonpreferred racial groups.
Indeed, if there are few qualified minority applicants, but race is decisive for
most or all of them, then this measure will indicate that too much weight is
being given to race when, in fact, the burden on nonpreferred applicants is
slight. Because this measure does not capture the burden of affirmative ac-
tion on nonpreferred applicants, it is not a good measure to use in the
constitutional calculus.
d. Grutter's Outcome Measure.-Grutter noted that the Law
School did not give race too much weight because it "frequently accept[ed]
nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than
underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who
[were] rejected."200 This "test" does not provide a good measure of the
constitutionally relevant costs of affirmative action.
The principal reason that this test does not capture the costs of
affirmative action that we care about is that its contours are not well defined.
First, it is unclear what the Court's definition of "frequently" is. The Court
cited to the brief of the University of Michigan for the proposition that the
Law School "frequently" admitted nonminorities with lower academic
qualifications than rejected minorities, 20 1 and the University's brief backed
199. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272.
200. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003).
201. Id.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 573 2006-2007
Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:517
up this assertion with the following data: "[s]ixty-nine minority applicants
were rejected between 1995 and 2000 with at least a 3.5 GPA and a 159 or
higher on the LSAT, while 85 white and Asian American applicants were
accepted from the same or lower cells., 20 2 This averages to a yearly rate of
11.5 minority applicants who were rejected with at least a 3.5 GPA and a 159
LSAT and 14.2 white or Asian American applicants who were accepted from
the same or lower cells.20 3 It is completely unclear what standards the Court
used to determine that this was a phenomenon that occurred "frequently. 20 4
Second, the contours of the test are ill-defined in that it focuses on a
"reference cell" (in this case, the cell corresponding to a GPA range starting
at 3.5 and an LSAT range starting at 159), but it does not explain how this
reference cell was selected. Does an admissions program pass the test as
long as any reference cell can be found that demonstrates preferred appli-
cants in that cell and higher were "frequently" rejected in favor of
nonpreferred applicants in lower cells?
20 5
The contours of this test are difficult to identify, and for that reason it is
not a good measure of the costs of affirmative action, but even if the test did
not suffer from these problems, it would not provide a good measure of the
costs of affirmative action along the outcome dimension because it does not
gauge the burden felt by nonpreferred racial groups. Instead, it focuses on
cases where nonpreferred applicants did not experience a burden. But
because this test does not provide a measure of the total number of applicants
for whom race was not decisive, it does not help in determining the number
202. Brief for Respondents, Grutter, supra note 88, at 10.
203. As a reference point, each year the Law School made approximately 1,300 offers of
admission and received over 3,500 applications. Id. at 2 n.3.
204. Indeed, perhaps for this reason, the one circuit court that has applied this "test" ignored the
word "frequently" altogether, noting that the law school whose admissions program was at issue
"also accepted nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented
minority applicants who were rejected, thus showing that the Law School 'seriously weigh[ed]
many other diversity factors besides race that [could] make a real and dispositive difference."'
Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338). The Smith test is, of course, entirely too lenient, as an admissions
program would pass muster under that test as long as at least two nonminority applicants were
accepted with grades and test scores that were lower than two minority applicants who were
rejected.
205. If this is the case, then we might be able to demonstrate that the College also "frequently"
admitted nonpreferred applicants over preferred applicants with higher scores who were rejected.
Indeed, our data analysis shows that if we divide College applicants into two groups, the first of
which is applicants with a GPA of 2.6 or higher and an SAT of 900 or higher, and the second of
which is applicants with either a GPA of less than 2.6 or an SAT of less than 900, we find that
between 1995 and 1999, 595 nonpreferred applicants with the lower credentials in the latter group
were accepted, while 165 preferred minority applicants with the higher credentials in the former
group were rejected. So, on average, each year 119 nonpreferred applicants with the lower
credentials were accepted, while 33 preferred minority applicants with the higher credentials were
rejected. As reference points, for the years between 1995 and 1999, each year the university
admitted an average of 10,011 applicants and received an average of 14,230 applications. Whether
this reference cell is an appropriate one to use for the test and whether these numbers rise to the
level of "frequently" is, of course, entirely unclear because the Court did not elaborate on this test.
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of applicants for whom race was decisive, the relevant inquiry on the
outcome dimension. Thus, this test fails to capture the costs of affirmative
action on the outcome dimension.
Grutter came tantalizingly close to factoring into the constitutional
calculus a constitutionally relevant measure of weight-the percentage of
enrollees who were but-for admits. In its section describing the facts and the
district court opinion, Grutter noted that the University of Michigan's expert
"predicted that if race were not considered" at the Law School,
"underrepresented minority students would have constituted 4 percent of the
entering class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent., 20 6 Of
course, this statistic can be used to calculate weight on the outcome
dimension-the statistic indicates that the percentage of enrollees who were
but-for admits was 10.5%. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Court had
easy access to this statistic, the Court failed to use it in its constitutional
calculus.2 °7
This section has argued that the Grutter and Gratz Courts' treatment of
the weight inquiry departed from the pre-Grutter and Gratz narrow tailoring
jurisprudence in that it abandoned the minimum necessary preference
inquiry. To the extent that Grutter and Gratz did pay attention to weight, the
four ways in which the opinions measured weight all suffer from the flaw
that they are not rooted in a theory for determining whether a given weight is
excessive. Furthermore, three of the four methods for measuring weight do
not measure a constitutionally relevant weight. And, while one of the meth-
ods measures a constitutionally relevant weight, it measures that weight
along only the means dimension and not also along the outcome dimension.
In sum, then, not only has the Court failed to come up with meaningful
measures of the weight given to race along both the means and outcome
dimensions, but also the Court has made no progress in coming up with a
way for determining whether a given weight is excessive.
The Court should not have replaced the minimum necessary preference
inquiry with this new individualized consideration inquiry. Instead, it should
have inquired into whether racial preferences were the minimum necessary.
Subpart V(B) outlines what such an inquiry should look like.
B. What the Narrow Tailoring Inquiry Should Look Like
Subpart V(A) argued that the Court took a wrong turn in Grutter and
Gratz by abandoning the minimum necessary preference requirement and
instead adopting a "Don't Tell, Don't Ask" individualization requirement. It
206. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320. The Court recited this statistic in the section of the opinion
describing the facts and the district court opinion.
207. The University of Michigan's expert statistician computed similar statistics for other years
at the Law School and the College, and the Court had access to these statistics. See supra notes 61-
72 and accompanying text. Despite its access to such statistics, however, the Court showed no
interest in factoring such statistics into its constitutional calculus.
2007]
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argued that this new individualization requirement is problematic for two
reasons. First, admissions programs that quantify should not be subject to
stricter scrutiny than those that do not. Second, the Court's weight inquiry
should examine whether the racial preferences are the minimum necessary to
achieve the interest in diversity instead of examining whether preferences are
excessive with no theory for what constitutes excessive weight and how to
measure it.
What should the narrow tailoring inquiry have looked like, then? No
program should pass strict scrutiny without careful consideration of whether
the racial preferences are the minimum necessary, including consideration of
whether preferences are sufficiently differentiated. Section 1 describes what
the minimum necessary preference inquiry should look like. In order to en-
gage in this inquiry, courts must examine data on the costs and benefits of
admissions programs. Section 2 argues that because of the need for data on
costs and benefits, narrow tailoring should require that universities
quantify-at least ex post-the costs and benefits of their affirmative action
programs.
Thus, like the Grutter and Gratz Courts, we embrace paying attention to
the quantification, differentiation, and weight dimensions of racial
preferences. But rather than proscribing quantification, we would require ex
post quantification, and we would further require that courts find that racial
preferences are the minimum necessary to achieve the diversity interest, in-
cluding that they are differentiated when necessary to minimize racial
preferences.
1. Minimum Necessary Preferences.-In order to determine whether a
preference is the minimum necessary, courts must conduct two kinds of cost-
benefit analysis. First, they must engage in an overall cost-benefit analysis
and ask whether the overall benefits justify the overall costs. After all, if the
benefits do not outweigh the costs, then the program is imposing an undue
burden on nonpreferred applicants. Of course, this inquiry into whether the
costs outweigh the benefits is inherently a normative one, turning on judg-
ments about what "price" to put on the benefits of diversity. Nonetheless,
this is the sort of inquiry narrow tailoring doctrine calls for to determine if a
racial preference is the minimum necessary.
Second, courts should also engage in a marginal cost-benefit analysis
and ask whether the marginal benefits justify the marginal costs of assigning
race the given weight. After all, if there are no marginal benefits, then the
university could achieve the same benefits by assigning a smaller weight to
race, and so the weight assigned to race is not the minimum necessary. And,
if the marginal benefits do not outweigh the marginal costs, then-just as is
[Vol. 85:517
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the case in analyzing overall benefits and costs-the program is imposing an
undue burden on nonpreferred applicants.208
In order to conduct these two cost-benefit analyses, of course, we must
be able to quantify the costs and benefits in some way. As for the costs,
while the Grutter and Gratz Courts offered several tests for measuring the
weight universities place on race, we argued in subpart V(A) that those tests
do not adequately measure the constitutionally relevant cost-the burden on
nonpreferred applicants. In Part III, we argued that the best way to measure
these costs is to measure the costs along the means and outcome
dimensions.209 One adjustment should be made to the measurement of the
outcome dimension, however. Rather than looking at the percentage of
admits who are but-for admits, courts should probably examine the
percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits. 210 This statistic better cap-
tures the actual cost experienced by nonpreferred applicants because it
measures the extent to which seats in the entering class were unavailable due
to affirmative action. We did not compute this statistic in Part III because
data on "yield"--the percentage of admits who accept offers of admission-
were not available to us. Instead, as a proxy for the percentage of enrollees
who were but-for admits, we calculated the percentage of admits who were
but-for admits.21'
Thus, courts should consider costs along the outcome and means
dimensions. For the outcome dimension, courts should examine the
percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits, and for the means dimension,
they should examine the effective credit that minorities receive on account of
212
their race, measured in GPA units, test score units, or other similar units.
208. The First Circuit has made progress in examining marginal costs and benefits. See
Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (finding it significant
that the district court concluded that "the benefits of intergroup contact continue to accrue as a
school becomes increasingly diverse"), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
209. Courts may need to aggregate the outcome and means dimensions. We describe one
possible way to aggregate these dimensions. See supra note 43.
210. If the yield-the percentage of admits who accept offers of admission-is the same for
preferred minorities and nonpreferred applicants, then the percentage of admits who are but-for
admits will be the same as the percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits. If, however, the
yield is different for preferred minorities and nonpreferred applicants, then the two statistics will be
different. See supra note 44.
211. Of course, it may be that the number of but-for admits is also independently significant.
Indeed, if two admissions programs have the same percentage of enrollees who are but-for admits
but different numbers of admits who are but-for admits, the program with the larger percentage of
admits who are but-for admits may be more burdensome than the one with the smaller percentage.
212. In some contexts other than higher education, it makes sense to measure costs only along
the outcome dimension. For example, when considering a secondary school assignment policy that
takes account of race but does not take account of qualifications of the students, there is no need to
examine whether there is a differential in qualifications along the means dimension, as
qualifications are irrelevant to the admissions decision. Relatedly, the cost of each unit along the
outcome dimension will vary depending on the context. See Comfort, 418 F.3d at 20 ("Every
child.., is guaranteed a seat in a district where, as the parties have stipulated, every school
provides a comparable education. The denial of a transfer under the Plan is therefore markedly
2007)
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Note that measuring the marginal costs of affirmative action is equivalent to
examining the qualification gap between the least qualified 2 3  but-for
enrollees and the best qualified nonpreferred rejectees who would have
enrolled if accepted.214
The benefits that are constitutionally relevant are those benefits that the
Court has stated make up the diversity interest. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Grutter articulated three benefits of diversity. 215 First, she noted
the impact in the classroom: "'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the
different from the denial of a spot at a unique or selective educational institution."). Finally, the
cost calculation should probably take into account not only the extent to which the affirmative
action program at issue burdens individuals, but also the extent to which the program burdens each
race. All other things being equal, it may make sense that an affirmative action program imposing
an equal burden on the races imposes lower net costs than an affirmative action program imposing
an unequal burden on the races. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426
F.3d 1162, 1192 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (finding it significant that "the [racial] tiebreaker does not
uniformly benefit any race or group of individuals to the detriment of another"), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
213. When we use the word "qualified," we mean qualified in a holistic sense, taking into
consideration all qualifications, including academic and nonacademic qualifications (but not race).
214. Cf supra note 74 (discussing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 42 and Wightman, supra note
74). This analysis assumes that the marginal costs along the outcome dimension do not depend on
the percentage of admits who are but-for admits, an assumption that may not be accurate. For
example, the costs of increasing the percentage of but-for admits from 1% to 2% might be lower
than the costs of increasing the percentage of but-for admits from 21% to 22%. To the extent that
the marginal costs vary depending on the percentage of admits who are but-for admits, these
varying marginal costs on the outcome dimension should be considered as well.
215. Lani Guinier characterizes Justice O'Connor's opinion as emphasizing three elements of
the diversity interest, the first of which was endorsed by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, and the
second two of which are new. These three elements are as follows: "diversity is pedagogical and
dialogic; it helps challenge stereotypes; and it helps legitimate the democratic mission of higher
education." Guinier, supra note 135, at 176 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has
characterized Grutter as articulating two elements of the diversity interest, combining our first and
second elements into a single element. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir.
2004) (characterizing the two primary benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter as the enrichment
of the "educational experience itself' and ensuring the effective participation of all racial and ethnic
groups in the nation's civic life).
Several commentators have analyzed the ways Justice O'Connor's diversity interest differs in
scope from Justice Powell's. See Guinier, supra note 135, at 173-76; K.G. Jan Pillai, The Defacing
Reconstruction of Powellian Diversity, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 40 (2005) (arguing that "Justice
O'Connor chose to expand the Powellian concept of diversity specifically to accommodate the
integrative and remedial components of all [extant] race-conscious admissions policies"); Post,
supra note 20, at 59-61 (comparing Grutter's focus on, inter alia, ensuring the participation of all
racial and ethnic groups in the nation's civic life and leadership with Justice Powell's focus in
Bakke on the educational benefits of diversity); Siegel, supra note 108, at 1538 (noting that "Grutter
does not simply incorporate Justice Powell's diversity rationale for race-conscious admissions
practices into the fabric of constitutional law" but rather that "Grutter transforms the diversity
rationale in the course of adopting it, expanding the concept of diversity so that it explicitly
embraces antisubordination values"); Rosman, supra note 120 (comparing the diversity rationales in
Grutter and Bakke); see also Primus, supra note 101, at 560 (characterizing the diversity interest
articulated in Grutter as being "in part about mitigating the effects that existing racial hierarchies
have on the composition of national leadership cadres" and not just about diversity's educational
benefits).
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greatest possible variety of backgrounds.' ' 216  Second, the Grutter Court
stated that racial diversity "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to
break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races."'' 217 Third, the Court viewed racial diversity as
helping both to ensure that higher education is "accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity 218 and also to make the "path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity."219 So, courts should determine the extent to which the program at
issue achieves these three benefits both overall and at the margin.2
Once the court has before it quantifications of the overall and marginal
costs and benefits, it can conduct the required cost-benefit calculus. 221 Of
216. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app.
at 246a, 244a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).
217. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 246a, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).
218. Id. at 331.
219. Id. at 332.
220. Note that the marginal benefits as a function of the number of minority enrollees may not
be-and likely is not-a constant function. Many claim that in order to enjoy many of the benefits
of a diverse student body, schools must enroll significant numbers of minority students. See, e.g.,
Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact on Educational
Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REv. 330, 360-61 (2002) (explaining that enrolling "significant
numbers of students of various groups" is necessary to enable students to "perceive differences both
within groups and between groups"); cf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316
(1978) (Powell, J.) (noting the "necessity of including more than a token number of black
students"). If this is so, then the marginal benefits of admitting preferred minority applicants are
smaller when the number of preferred minority students who will be enrolled is less than the
number needed to form a "critical mass," and the marginal benefits then jump suddenly when the
number of preferred minority students who will be enrolled reaches the "critical mass number." Cf
Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Teaching Race Without a Critical Mass: Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Diversity Rationale, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 332-34 (2004) (noting that
under a cost-benefit analysis it may be more difficult to uphold an affinative action program when
a university is unable to enroll a critical mass of minority applicants). Whether universities have an
interest in enrolling more than a critical mass of minority students should turn on the marginal
benefits (and costs) of enrolling those students. Cf Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 20-
22 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (upholding an affirmative action program that sought to enroll more
than a critical mass of minorities because the evidence suggested that marginal benefits accrued
when more than a critical mass of minority applicants was enrolled, but not analyzing the marginal
costs), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
221. Interestingly, it follows from this analysis that universities can assign more weight to race
under Justice O'Connor's diversity rationale than they could under Justice Powell's diversity
rationale. This is because Justice Powell focused only on the benefits of diversity that were intrinsic
to the university experience and were not race-specific. In his view, a diverse student body helps
create an "atmosphere... conducive to speculation, experiment and creation," and promotes the
"robust exchange of ideas." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In contrast, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor focused not only on benefits of holistic diversity that were
intrinsic to the university setting, but also on race-specific benefits enjoyed both on and off campus.
See supra text accompanying notes 215-19. In particular, the Grutter Court stated that racial
diversity "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables
[students] to better understand persons of different races"; helps ensure that higher education is
'accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity"; and also makes the "path to
leadership ... visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."
2007]
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course, the costs and benefits are not measured in the same units. But this
does not mean they are necessarily incommensurable. The law frequently
trades off radically different values, such as lives and dollars or disparate im-
pacts and business justifications. We recognize that the cost and benefit
quanta are difficult to compare, but we see two advantages to attempting to
compare these incommensurable values anyway. First, simply making public
the information about the benefits and costs of affirmative action programs is
valuable, performing an educative function.
Second, although it will often be difficult to make sense of these
incommensurable values, sometimes we will be able to make conclusions
about the constitutionality of a program by comparing the values. In
particular, if it turns out that there are no marginal benefits to a particular
racial preference, then it is clear that the preference is not the minimum nec-
essary and is therefore unconstitutional. For example, if an increase in the
number of but-for admits does not result in an increase in the quality of class-
room discussions, amount of cross-racial understanding, or sense in which
universities are open to students of all races, then that increase in the number
of but-for admits is not justified.
Even if the marginal benefits are nonzero, courts can in case-by-case
fashion develop a jurisprudence of comparison. For example, if admitting
two percent of an entering class on the basis of their race improves cross-
racial understanding by a significant amount, then courts could openly debate
whether these benefits are worth the costs. So, to pass constitutional muster,
we would require that a court find that an admissions program's overall
benefits justify its overall costs, and that its marginal benefits justify its
marginal costs.
222
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-32 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the benefits of diversity
described by Justice Powell, these benefits are particular to racial diversity, and the latter benefits
extend beyond the university campus. Thus, when conducting marginal cost-benefit analysis, the
marginal benefit to admitting a preferred minority applicant under Justice O'Connor's diversity
rationale is greater than or equal to the marginal benefit to admitting a minority applicant under
Justice Powell's diversity rationale because there are more marginal benefits to admitting a minority
applicant under Justice O'Connor's rationale. Cf Post, supra note 20, at 62 (noting the "far-
reaching implications" of the Grutter diversity rationale and finding it to be in conflict both with the
Court's assertion that .'outright racial balancing' would be 'patently unconstitutional' and also
with the individualized consideration requirement (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330)); see also
supra note 215.
222. Two post-Grutter and Gratz circuit court opinions addressing affirmative action programs
in contexts other than higher education have made some progress towards engaging in this cost-
benefit inquiry. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1, the
Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of a secondary school assignment plan. 426 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). The court computed the
percentage of admits who were but-for admits, id. at 1170-71, and thus computed all relevant costs,
see supra note 212. The court did not, however, go on to quantify the benefits and conduct cost-
benefit analysis. It did, though, attempt to justify the particular amount of weight placed on race by
noting the similar weight assigned to race in desegregation plans. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at
1186 (noting that, like the plan at issue in the case, most desegregation programs had a goal of
matching the surrounding community within fifteen percentage points). In Petit v. City of Chicago,
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Section IV(B)(2) noted that the Grutter and Gratz opinions suggested
another inquiry that might be relevant to the individualization inquiry-that
admissions programs should provide differentiated preferences, assigning
race different weights depending on an applicant's mix of characteristics.
We agree that courts should pay attention to differentiation, and we think that
the differentiation inquiry should grow out of the minimum necessary prefer-
ence inquiry. Indeed, the minimum necessary preference principle should
mean that a school does not give racial preferences to minorities who are not
likely to generate benefits. For example, if, as intimated in Gratz, it is shown
that upper class African Americans contribute less to the benefits of diversity
than lower class African Americans, then the preferences for upper class
African Americans should be commensurably less.
223
2. Quantified Preferences.-In order for a court to conduct a minimum
necessary preference inquiry, it must have available to it data on the overall
and marginal costs and benefits of the affirmative action program at issue.
We think that universities should be required to produce such data in order
for their admissions programs to pass strict scrutiny. After all, courts cannot
conduct the minimum necessary preference and differentiation inquiries
without these data, and universities should be considering these data as they
design their programs, so it makes sense to place this burden on them. Of
course, parties challenging university policies would also be free to produce
their own data, and the adversarial system can sort out which data to credit.
Thus, we would impose a "quantification" requirement of sorts. The
quantification we would require, however, is not ex ante quantification-that
is, we would not require that universities use point systems or other
quantified means to admit applicants (nor would we prohibit them from using
the Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of an affirmative action program that gave
minorities a boost on a test used to determine which employees to promote. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir.
2003). The opinion discussed data from which the number of but-for promoted employees could be
calculated and thus came close to measuring the weight assigned to race along the outcome
dimension. See id. at 1116-17 (stating the number of minorities who would have been promoted in
the absence of the affirmative action program and the number of minorities actually promoted). In
addition, the opinion cited data that attempted to measure the test score boost minority applicants
received and thus came close to measuring the weight assigned to race along the means dimension.
See id. at 1117 (comparing the pre-boost and post-boost test scores for the least-qualified white,
African American, and Hispanic applicants in the top 500 applicants). The opinion did not,
however, attempt to quantify the benefits, and it did not compare the costs and the benefits. It may
be that the opinion did not do so because the test score adjustment scheme at issue was justified, in
part, on the ground that it was necessary to compensate for a discriminatory test that unfairly
favored whites. See id. ("[S]tandardizing the scores can be seen not as an arbitrary advantage given
to the minority officers, but rather as eliminating an advantage the white officers had on the test.").
223. Moreover, courts should examine the extent to which preferences are differentiated in fact
by looking at actual practices, not by examining only university policies that merely assert that
preferences are differentiated. The extreme deference that Justice O'Connor showed to state
officials is deeply inconsistent with the whole idea of strict scrutiny as an attempt to smoke out
unjustified governmental racial preferences. That is, we would look at actual differentiation, not
potential differentiation.
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such systems). Rather, the quantification we would require would at least be
ex post and ongoing-that is, we would require that universities periodically
quantify the overall and marginal costs and benefits -of their affirmative ac-
tion programs, including marginal costs and benefits of differentiation.
Under our quantification requirement, if a university's affirmative action
program were challenged and the university did not come forward with data
about its costs and benefits, we would find that the program is per se not nar-
rowly tailored because it is impossible to conduct the minimum necessary
preference and differentiation inquiries. If, on the other hand, a university
did come forward with data about the relevant costs and benefits, courts
could subject the program to the minimum necessary preference inquiry, in-
cluding an inquiry into whether the program is sufficiently differentiated.
For the costs, we would require universities to compute the overall and
marginal costs on both the outcome and means dimensions. To figure out the
overall costs, universities would need to calculate the percentage of enrollees
who were but-for admits and the effective credit those but-for admits
received.2 4 To compute the marginal costs, universities would need to
estimate the quality differential between the least qualified but-for enrollees
and the best qualified rejected applicants who would have been admitted and
would have enrolled in the absence of affirmative action.2 25 For the benefits,
we would require universities to quantify the extent to which the admissions
program achieves the three benefits of the diversity rationale described in the
Grutter opinion, both overall and at the margin: enriched classroom discus-
sions and campus atmosphere, improved cross-racial understanding, and an
increased sense that universities are open to individuals of all races.
226
VI. Conclusion
The affirmative action program the Supreme Court upheld in Grutter
appears to have granted larger racial preferences than the program the Court
struck down in Gratz. Because a minimum necessary preference requirement
was an important part of the narrow tailoring requirement before Grutter and
Gratz, this result is at the very least surprising. The Law School should have
been required to show something more than the College to justify these
larger preferences. But, instead of demanding more, the Supreme Court
demanded less of the Law School.
Was the Court wrong to uphold the Grutter system and strike down the
Gratz system? We simply do not have enough information to determine
whether the Court got the outcomes wrong in Grutter and Gratz. And that is
precisely one of the problems this Article has argued that courts ought to
224. See supra text accompanying note 212.
225. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
226. For a description of the Gnttter diversity rationale, see supra notes 215-19 and
accompanying text.
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correct. Courts should require defendants to provide the information that is
necessary to resolve this question-that is, courts should require that
defendants quantify the overall and marginal costs and benefits of granting
racial preferences. Only then can courts engage in inquiries that determine
whether racial preferences are truly narrowly tailored to the diversity interest.
Courts should return to the minimum necessary preference requirement.
They should examine the overall and marginal costs and benefits of racial
preferences to determine if the university is using the smallest possible pref-
erence to achieve the objectives of the diversity interest. In addition, this
Article has embraced the Court's articulation of the differentiation principle,
but we believe courts should determine whether racial preferences are suffi-
ciently differentiated by examining the actual costs and benefits to
differentiation.
Thus, like Grutter and Gratz, this Article has advocated that the narrow
tailoring inquiry should involve examination of three dimensions of racial
preferences: quantification, differentiation, and size. Also like Grutter and
Gratz, this Article has argued that quantification should trigger different
levels of review of differentiation and size. Unlike Grutter and Gratz,
however, which essentially held that lack of quantification triggers almost no
such scrutiny, we think that lack of quantification should render an admis-
sions program unconstitutional. And, while Grutter and Gratz established
that quantification triggers scrutiny that is so intense that is likely to be fatal
in fact, we believe that quantification should trigger a strict scrutiny that
forces decisionmakers to prove that they used the minimum necessary
preference.
It is difficult to quantify the burdens of racial preferences and even more
difficult to quantify government interests in nonremedial affirmative action.
But the Supreme Court erred in turning its back on the core requirement that
the means of racial preferences must be narrowly tailored to government
objectives. At the end of the day, the Court evinced shockingly little interest
in determining the actual size of the Law School's racial preferences. It is
impossible to assess whether the benefits outweigh the costs if the Court does
not know what is on either side of the scale. The fuzzy math of unquantified
preferences should not excuse government actors from showing that they are
in fact using the minimum necessary preference.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 583 2006-2007
"k "k
HeinOnline -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 584 2006-2007
